The defendant filed a motion for recusal, abstention, dismissal and a request for trial by jury. The court denied the requests for recusal, dismissal and abstention. The court struck the defendant’s jury demand because the plaintiff’s claim under 11 U.S.C. sec. 549 is not one for which the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution preserves the right to a jury trial.
In re Bethe, Case No. 11-25388 (September 2017) -- Chief Judge G.M. Halfenger
Section 1328(a) of title 11 provides that the court shall grant a debtor a discharge when, among other requirements, the debtor has completed “all payments under the plan”. Direct-pay maintenance payments on long-term debt provided for in a chapter 13 plan are “payments under the plan” for purposes of section 1328(a). Debtors who fail to make such payments are not entitled to a discharge.
In re Brian and Virginia Kropp, Case No. 16-29342 (June 2017) -- Chief Judge G.M. Halfenger
The court denied the debtors' third request to delay the grant of the discharge because Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004(c)(2) does not authorize a debtor to obtain a delay of the discharge after an initial 30-day period of deferment expiries.
In re Jamiela Yvonne Flournoy, Case No. 16-21984 (March 2017) -- Chief Judge G.M. Halfenger
Credit Acceptance Corp., a creditor with a security interest in the debtor's vehicle, objected to confirmation because the debtor's plan proposed to eliminate its lien on a non-filing co-debtor's interest in the collateral. The court concluded that the creditor's right to collect the debt from the non-filing co-debtor's interest in the vehicle could not be eliminated under 11 U.S.C. sec. 1322(b)(2).
Michael A. Gral v. Estate of Margolis, Adv. Proc. No. 16-2193 (March 2017) -- Chief Judge G.M. Halfenger
The court concluded that property transferred from a revocable trust to the debtor's non-filing spouse constituted individual property of the non-filing spouse and not property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate.
In re Luz Myriam Osorio, Case No. 13-25522 (March 2017) -- Chief Judge G.M. Halfenger
The debtor filed a motion for contempt and for sanctions against a creditor for violation of the discharge injunction. The court concluded (1) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the court from exercising jurisdiction over the debtor's motion because the court retained original jurisdiction to enforce the discharge injunction; (2) an Illinois State Court's denial of the debtor's motion to vacate its orders based on the debtor's discharge did not preclude the bankruptcy court from reviewing the debtor's motion for contempt and for sanctions; and (3) the actions taken by the creditor did not violate the discharge injunction.
In re Lori C. Dohrmann, Case No. 14-27137 (March 2017) -- Chief Judge G.M. Halfenger
The debtor filed a motion to reconsider the court's order dismissing her case because she did not file her chapter 13 plan in good faith but, rather, filed the plan and chapter 13 case in an attempt to re-litigate a state-court judgment with a creditor. The court denied the debtor's motion to reconsider because she did not clearly establish that there was newly discovered evidence or that the court committed a legal or factual error.
Capital Ventures, LLC v. Estate of Margolis, Adv. Proc. No. 16-2140 (March 2017) -- Chief Judge G.M. Halfenger
A mortgage that debtor Capital Ventures, LLC executed to secure debt owed only by debtor Michael Gral was a valid and enforceable mortgage under Wisconsin law.
In re Angela Wright, Case No. 16-21463 (March 2017) -- Chief Judge G.M. Halfenger
First National Bank, a mortgage creditor in the debtor's bankruptcy case, filed an application for the approval of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016. The application sought to recover fees that First National Bank had paid its own lawyers to litigate on its behalf, and associated costs. The court denied First National Bank's application as moot because First National Bank had filed a timely proof of claim and the court concluded that the fees allegedly due under the note and mortgage were properly a part of its amended proof of claim.
In re Tinita Holmes, Case No. 15-31329 (December 2016) -- Chief Judge G.M. Halfenger
The chapter 13 trustee objected to plan confirmation because the debtor had not demonstrated that she devoted all of her projected disposable income to pay general unsecured creditors. See 11 U.S.C. §1325(b). Specifically, the trustee argued that the debtor failed to account for contributions to the debtor's household made by the debtor's mother when calculating the debtor's projected disposable income. The debtor, relying on 11 U.S.C. §101(10A), contended that because her mother's only income was social security, she did not have to account for her mother's contributions. The court sustained the trustee's objection.