Under doctrine of judicial estoppel, chapter 13 debtor was prohibited from arguing his conduct did not result in a willful and/or malicious injury pursuant to sec. 1328(a)(4), due to his previous state court stipulation that obligation was nondischargeable based on the willful and malicious injury to plaintiff.
Certain electronic fund transfers and credit card receivables received prepetition by the chapter 11 debtor's fuel supplier were avoidable preferences. Because payment terms for new fuel shipments changed from being due 10 days after delivery to cash-in-advance, the additional payments on the balance owed the supplier were neither contemporaneous exchanges for new value nor made in the ordinary course of the parties' business.
Court overruled chapter 11 debtor's objections to claims of former employees. Employees were entitled to wages earned but not paid pursuant to doctrine of quantum meruit.
Because chapter 13 debtor failed to establish the untimely filing of claim on behalf of omitted creditor was the result of his excusable neglect, his motion for enlargement of time in which to file a claim was denied. Even if excusable neglect had been established, any amount still due and owing to omitted creditor upon debtor's discharge would remain nondischargeable.
Court sustained chapter 13 trustee's objection to confirmation of plan based upon debtors' erroneous calculation of tax obligations.
Secured creditor opposed confirmation of chapter 13 plan which required creditor to notify debtor annually of accrued postpetition fees, expenses or charges. The court overruled the objection, finding the annual notice requirement was not onerous.
Minority owner and major creditor of chapter 7 corporate debtor objected to the proofs of claim of the debtor's majority owner and former employee. The court sustained the objections and found the claimants were not entitled to compensation under the doctrine of quantum meruit.
Plaintiff home buyers who paid contractor/seller $20,000 for post-purchase construction did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant contractor obtained the $20,000 by false pretenses, and thus did not prove their cause of action for nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(2)(A). The plaintiffs did prove, however, that when the defendant used the $20,000 to pay the closing costs at the time of sale, rather than holding it in trust to pay subcontractors and material suppliers on the post-purchase construction, the defendant committed defalcation in a fiduciary capacity, and therefore that the debt was nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(4). The Court found, contrary to the defendant's assertions, that the plaintiffs clearly gave the defendant the $20,000 for "improvements," and that the fact that the defendant alleged that he'd told the plaintiffs he needed to use it to pay closing costs was not a defense.