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Opinions


    Ignacio Mendiola, Case No. 17-23628 (September 2017) -- Judge B.H. Ludwig
    After the Chapter 13 debtor filed his sixth petition in six years, secured creditor was granted in rem relief from stay and debtor was barred from filing another case for 180 days.


    In re Bethe, Case No. 11-25388 (September 2017) -- Chief Judge G.M. Halfenger
    Section 1328(a) of title 11 provides that the court shall grant a debtor a discharge when, among other requirements, the debtor has completed “all payments under the plan”. Direct-pay maintenance payments on long-term debt provided for in a chapter 13 plan are “payments under the plan” for purposes of section 1328(a). Debtors who fail to make such payments are not entitled to a discharge.


    In re Sier, Case No. 17-20837 (August 2017) -- Judge B.E. Hanan
    The chapter 7 debtor moved to reopen her case in order to vacate her discharge order and file reaffirmation agreements made after the discharge order was entered. The court denied the motion, questioning first whether the court could vacate the discharge order for such a purpose, and concluding that, in any event, the debtor had failed to demonstrate that she was entitled to relief under Rule 60(b).


    In re Carr (July 2017) -- Judge S.V. Kelley
    On post-confirmation dismissal of a Chapter 13 case, funds the trustee is holding are disbursed to the debtor, not the creditors.


    In re Schmidt, Case No. 08-25973 (July 2017) -- Judge B.E. Hanan
    The court granted the motion of the debtor's personal representative to reopen the case, file a certificate of financial management, and obtain a discharge, despite the passage of several years, outlining the factors courts consider in determining whether to grant such a motion.


    In re Brian and Virginia Kropp, Case No. 16-29342 (June 2017) -- Chief Judge G.M. Halfenger
    The court denied the debtors' third request to delay the grant of the discharge because Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004(c)(2) does not authorize a debtor to obtain a delay of the discharge after an initial 30-day period of deferment expiries.


    In re Jamiela Yvonne Flournoy, Case No. 16-21984 (March 2017) -- Chief Judge G.M. Halfenger
    Credit Acceptance Corp., a creditor with a security interest in the debtor's vehicle, objected to confirmation because the debtor's plan proposed to eliminate its lien on a non-filing co-debtor's interest in the collateral. The court concluded that the creditor's right to collect the debt from the non-filing co-debtor's interest in the vehicle could not be eliminated under 11 U.S.C. sec. 1322(b)(2).


    Michael A. Gral v. Estate of Margolis, Adv. Proc. No. 16-2193 (March 2017) -- Chief Judge G.M. Halfenger
    The court concluded that property transferred from a revocable trust to the debtor's non-filing spouse constituted individual property of the non-filing spouse and not property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate.


    In re Luz Myriam Osorio, Case No. 13-25522 (March 2017) -- Chief Judge G.M. Halfenger
    The debtor filed a motion for contempt and for sanctions against a creditor for violation of the discharge injunction. The court concluded (1) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the court from exercising jurisdiction over the debtor's motion because the court retained original jurisdiction to enforce the discharge injunction; (2) an Illinois State Court's denial of the debtor's motion to vacate its orders based on the debtor's discharge did not preclude the bankruptcy court from reviewing the debtor's motion for contempt and for sanctions; and (3) the actions taken by the creditor did not violate the discharge injunction.


    In re Lori C. Dohrmann, Case No. 14-27137 (March 2017) -- Chief Judge G.M. Halfenger
    The debtor filed a motion to reconsider the court's order dismissing her case because she did not file her chapter 13 plan in good faith but, rather, filed the plan and chapter 13 case in an attempt to re-litigate a state-court judgment with a creditor. The court denied the debtor's motion to reconsider because she did not clearly establish that there was newly discovered evidence or that the court committed a legal or factual error.