USBC Location

U.S. Bankruptcy Court
126 U.S. Courthouse
517 East Wisconsin Ave.
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
53202-4581

Office Hours:
8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m, M-F

Main Office Phone Number:
(414) 297-3291

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(866) 582-3156 ext. 3200

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(877) 781-7277   or
(414) 297-3582

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(800) 676-6856

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Decisions
Hon. Margaret Dee McGarity

Issue preclusion barred relitigation of state court judgments against chapter 7 debtor for assault and battery, as well as derivative claims for loss of society and companionship, making the judgments nondischargeable under sec. 523(a)(6). In re David M. Larsen, Case No. 09-22963, Teri Jendusa-Nicolai, et al. v. Debtor, Adv. No. 09-2231

Chapter 13 debtor who voluntarily dismissed previous bankruptcy case in which secured creditors had moved for relief from the automatic stay was not eligible to be a debtor under sec. 109(g)(2). (This decision is a court minute decision, only.) In re Mazen N. Khoury, Case No. 09-31074

Court abstained from exercising jurisdiction over funds related to state court receivership. In re David Michael Larsen, Case No. 09-22963

Chapter 7 trustee objected to the debtor's claim of exemption in a lien on his former marital home, executed by his former spouse, in partial settlement of their divorce proceedings eight years prior to the bankruptcy filing.  The court sustained the objection, finding the debtor lost his right to claim either a federal or state homestead exemption. In re Daniel A. Fink, Case No. 09-23299

Secured creditor filed an objection to confirmation of the chapter 13 debtors' plan, arguing the financing of the negative equity on the debtors' used trade-in vehicle was included in the financing of their new vehicle purchase, resulting in its claim being protected from cram down under sec. 1325(a).  The debtors argued the negative equity resulting from the trade-in of their old vehicle was not part of the purchase money security interest, and was thus not subject to the 910-day rule imposed by the hanging paragraph in sec. 1325(a).  The court sustained the creditor's objection, concluding the entire amount of the debt securing the new vehicle met the definition of purchase money security interest. In re Brian & Patsy Morey, Case No. 09-26318

Chapter 7 pro se debtor moved for the appointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 1915(e)(1). The court denied the motion, finding no exceptional circumstances justified the appointment of pro bono counsel.  In re David Michael Larsen, Case No. 09-22963 Published: In re Larsen, 406 B.R. 821 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2009).

The chapter 13 trustee opposed confirmation of plan which treated student loan creditor as separately classified creditor, arguing it unfairly discriminated against the other unsecured creditors. The court overruled the trustee's objection, finding the specific provisions of sec. 1322(b)(5) for the cure of arrearages and maintenance of regular payments on long term indebtedness applied and superceded the general unfair discrimination provisions of sec. 1322(b)(1). In re Timothy & LeAnn Truss, Case No. 08-21626 Published: In re Truss, 404 B.R. 329 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2009).

The plaintiffs in theft by contractor cause of action were entitled to judgment of nondischargeability under sec. 523(a)(4).  The court found the services performed for the debtor's construction company fell within the provisions of both the old and new versions of Wis. Stat. sec. 779.02(5). In re Robert & Sandra Ecker, Case No. 07-29439, Fischer Construction, et al. v. Robert Ecker, Adv. No. 08-2059 Published: In re Ecker, 400 B.R. 669 (Bankr. E. D. Wis. 2009).

The chapter 13 trustee opposed confirmation of the debtor's plan because she included non-escrow homeowners' insurance and real estate taxes on Line 47 of Form 22C.  The court overruled the trustee's objection as it related to the deduction for insurance and property taxes because, even though those expenses were not paid into an escrow account, such payments were required by the contract that created the security interest. In re Christine C. Bermann, Case No. 08-28387 Published: In re Bermann, 399 B.R. 213 (Bankr. E. D. Wis. 2009).

Creditor opposed the chapter 11 debtors' proposed disclosure statement on the grounds that it did not adequately describe the cross-collateralization of the debtors' obligations to it. The court determined the debtors' original mortgage on their homestead did not secure the subsequent business notes. In re Charles & Mary Kay Becker, Case No. 07-26001 Published: In re Becker, 400 B.R. 221 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2009).

Debtor who was currently incarcerated in a prison that was experiencing difficulties with its telephone service moved for at least a temporary waiver of the prepetition credit counseling requirement. Prisoner's motion for exemption from credit counseling was denied by the court because no "exigent circumstances" existed, of a kind entitling the debtor to a temporary waiver of the requirement.  Furthermore, the debtor's incarceration did not rise to the level of "disability," of a kind warranting a permanent waiver of the credit counseling requirement. In re David Michael Larsen, Case No. 08-33993 Published: In re Larsen, 399 B.R. 634 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2009).

Trustee's objection to debtor's motion for modification of confirmed chapter 13 plan was sustained. Although debtor failed to remit one-half of tax refunds as required by confirmed plan, she proposed to cease payments to unsecured creditors, arguing they had already received the dividend provided for in the confirmed plan. The court concluded the debtor's attempt to receive a discharge after defaulting on the plan and violating the terms of the confirmation order was impermissible. In re Willie Mae Carson, Case No. 04-26733 Published: In re Carson, 397 B.R. 911 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008).

Lender's security interest, perfected within 90 days of the debtor's petition date, was avoided under s. 547 of the Code. The lender's defenses of equity and equitable subrogation were rejected by the court. In re Vission, Inc., Case No. 07-21957, Paul G. Swanson, Trustee v. Trasino Park-Hudsons, LLC, et al., Adv. No. 07-2111 Published: In re Vission, Inc., 400 B.R. 215 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008).

Secured creditors' objections to chapter 13 plans were sustained, in part, and overruled, in part. The plan provision providing for separate treatment of prepetition arrearage(s) as contractually current was allowed, as interpreted by the court. The plan provision providing the mortgage(s) was current upon discharge was not allowed. In re Mary & Vernell Patton, et al., Case Nos. 08-23038, 08-24709, 07-28262

Chapter 13 debtors who experienced a reduction in income immediately preceeding the filing of their bankruptcy petition proposed to pay unsecured creditors less than the distribution required under the means test.  The trustee opposed confirmation of the plan.  The court determined that the term "projected disposable income" should not always be based solely on a historical perspective of income from Form B22C alone, but rather other evidence could be considered when a debtor experiences a significant change in circumstances reducing income at or around the time of the bankruptcy filing. In re Daniel & Eleanor Hilton, Case No. 08-25440 Published: In re Hilton, 395 B.R. 433 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008).

Creditor filed a motion to have its adversary complaint objecting to the dischargeability of an obligation, which was filed before the deadline to file proofs of claim in the debtor's chapter 13 case,  construed as an informal proof of claim.  The court denied the motion.  Although the complaint evidenced the creditor's intent to hold the debtor liable for the obligation, it did not express an intent to hold the chapter 13 estate liable. In re Kelly Ann Wood, Case No. 08-21191

After the chapter 13 debtors defaulted under the terms of their prepetition lease and the automatic stay was lifted, the vehicle was repossessed by the creditor and sold. The creditor asserted an administrative claim for the amounts remaining due under the lease. The court granted the creditor’s motion, finding the obligation was beneficial to the estate.In re James & Judith Michalek, Case No. 06-23355 Published: In re Michalek, 393 B.R. 642 (Bankr. E. D. Wis. 2008).

Below-median income chapter 13 debtor's plan, which proposed to limit contribution of one half of debtor's tax refunds to the first three years of the plan and use the funds to shorten the length of the plan, was not proposed in good faith. In re Sonya D. Simpson, Case No. 08-21251

The state brought an adversary proceeding against the debtor, seeking a determination that an obligation for child care overpayments was nondischargeable. The court granted summary judgment to the state, finding Wisconsin Works (W2) Child Care Subsidy overpayments to chapter 7 debtor were domestic support obligations within the meaning of sec. 101(14A) and thus nondischargeable pursuant to sec. 523(a)(5). In re Stephanie Schauer, Case No. 07-26758, State of Wisconsin v. Debtor, Adv. No. 07-2317 Published: In re Schauer, 391 B.R. 430 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008).

Chapter 13 debtors' attorney was "unsecured creditor" entitled to share in the unsecured creditors' pool of monthly disposable income under sec. 1325(b)(1)(B). In re Robert & Gladys Nething, Case No. 07-27145

Chapter 13 debtor could not deduct student loan payment as an additional expense claim on Line 59 of Form 22C due to "special circumstances." In re Jason Zahringer, Case No. 07-30217

Chapter 7 debtor owed plaintiff insurance company a subrogation claim resulting from damages to vehicle driven by debtor without permission of owner.  Because previous state court action did not litigate the issue of intent, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in sec. 523(a)(6) proceeding was denied. In re Brian Whitelaw, Case No. 07-27846, American Standard Ins. Co. v. Debtor, Adv. No. 07-2282

In adversary proceeding involving the conflicting legal rights of two creditors in the business assets of the debtor, summary judgment was granted, in part, and denied, in part.  Although bank had knowledge of debtor's previous pledge of assets to creditor, bank perfected its security interest first, making its lien superior.  The creditor's request, in the alternative, for marshaling of assets could not be granted, as a matter of law, at the summary judgment stage. In re Vission, Inc., Case No. 07-21957, Trustee v. Trasino Park-Hudsons, LLC, et al., Adv. No. 07-2111

Chapter 13 debtor objection to proof of claim filed by mortgage lender, on ground that deficiency had been rolled into total amount owed, as set forth in previous reaffimration agreement. The court sustained the objection and concluded the reaffirmation agreement changed the terms of mortgage note as it pertained to the caculation and collectability of arrearages incurred prior to when the reaffirmation agreement was entered into. In re Tyrone & Tammy Eiler, Case No. 07-26168 Published: In re Eiler, 390 B.R. 920 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008).

U.S. Trustee's motion to dismiss pursuant to sec. 707(b) was granted.  Chapter 7 debtors were not entitled to additional transportation expense on Line 22 of Form 22A for each of their vehicles after the loan was paid off. In re Jaime & Guadalupe Martinez, Case No. 07-26673 Published: In re Martinez, 391 B.R. 424 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008).

Chapter 7 trustee objected to exemption claimed by debtors in cash surrender values of their life insurance policies.  The court sustained the objection, finding debtors' exemption of the value of contracts of life insurance policies were limited by sec. 815.18(3)(f)3.b, Wis. Stat., with respect to funding any increase in such value that took place within 24 months of filing.  In re James & Michelle Bork, Case No. 07-27105 Published: In re Bork, 389 B.R. 823 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008).

County's actions in attempting to collect, post-discharge, interest on property taxes which was not paid through the chapter 13 plan  was not a violation of the discharge injunction.  (This decision is a court minute decision, only.) In re Gerald & Margaret Tevz, Case No. 01-30923, Debtors v. Milwaukee County, Adv. No. 07-2146

In pre-BAPCPA case, chapter 13 debtor was not allowed to modify plan to limited payments of one half of tax refunds to only the first three years of the newly-extended plan. In re Lacey K. Rither, Case No. 05-23558

Chapter 13 debtor was not allowed to take a deduction on Means Test for "future payments on secured claims" for surrendered residence. In re Melvin M. Kalata, Case No. 07-21710

Chapter 13 debtors were allowed to take a vehicle ownership expense deduction for a vehicle they owned free and clear.  In re Roger & Roberta Clark, Case No. 07-23390

Chapter 11 debtor, the holder of patent for a non-dichroic signal mirror, brought an adversary proceeding against a competitor that had filed a proof of claim against the estate for the competitor's alleged infringement of its patent, alleged breach of alliance agreement between the parties, and tortious interference with its contractual relations, and the competitor counterclaimed against the debtor. The court  held the debtors' patent was invalid and the competitor's product did not infringe that patent.  The competitor did, however, breach the parties' alliance agreement, causing the debtor to suffer damages.  In re Muth Mirror Systems, LLC, et al., Case No. 06-25609, Muth Mirror Systems, LLC, et al. v. Gentex Corp. v. Muth Mirror Systems, LLC, et al., Adv. No. 06-2470 Published: In re Muth Mirror Systems, LLC, 379 B.R. 805 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2007).

Creditor with a security interest in chapter 13 debtors' motor vehicle moved for relief from stay after the vehicle was destroyed in an automobile accident postpetition and postconfirmation, in order to permit it to apply insurance proceeds paid by a third-party tortfeasor's insurer to its remaining secured and unsecured claims. The debtors and trustee objected, and disputed that the creditor had an interest in the insurance proceeds to the full extent of its remaining claims.  The court granted the creditor's motion in part and denied it in part. The creditor's recovery of insurance proceeds paid by third party's insurance carrier after debtors' collateral was destroyed was limited to its allowed secured claim. In re Linda & Timothy Hardin, Case No. 03-31539 Published: In re Hardin, 375 B.R. 506 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2007).

Creditor brought an adversary proceeding to deny the chapter 7 debtors a discharge based on the debtor-wife's alleged fraudulent prepetition transfer of assets. The court dismissed the complaint, finding the debtors' prepetition transfer of personal property into wholly-owned corporation did not evidence wrongful intent required for a denial of discharge under sec. 727(a)(2). In re John & Jean Sundstrom, Case No. 05-41463, Emerging Vision, Inc. v. Sundstrom, Adversary No. 06-2286 Published: In re Sundstrom, 374 B.R. 663 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2007).

Chapter 13 debtors sought to modify their confirmed plan, after experiencing significant medical expenses and a reduction in the debtor-husband's pay.  The court sustained the trustee's objection to the modification, in part. The chapter 13 debtors were not allowed to retroactively modify their confirmed plan to retain one-half of their tax refunds previously committed to their creditors.  Because the tax refunds were necessary for the maintenance and support of the debtors, they were allowed to prospectively retain their entire tax refunds. In re Vincent & Paquita Young, Case No. 03-31975 Published: In re Young, 370 B.R. 799 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2007).

Chapter 13 trustee was compelled to remit plan payments to the creditor holding a secured claim in the debtors' vehicle pending resolution of the motion for relief from the automatic stay. In re Paul & Marsha Christensen, Case No. 03-32627

Chapter 13 debtor objected to her former landlord's proof of claim. The court sustained the objection, in part, finding the residential landlord's claim for prepetition and postpetition rent did not qualify as an administrative expense under sec. 503(b). In re Lisa Perry, Case No. 06-26132 Published: In re Perry, 369 B.R. 402 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2007). 

Following completion of the chapter 13 debtors' payments under their confirmed plan, the trustee moved to dismiss, on the ground that secured creditors had not been paid in full and the debtors could not feasibly satisfy the secured debts within the maximum five-year term.  The court denied the motion, finding the debtors were entitled to a discharge under the confirmed plan, even though secured claims had not been paid in full, because creditors received adequate notice of their rights under the plan and plan clearly spelled out the longer amortization periods of the secured claims. In re Brad & Leanna Westenberg, Case No. 03-21749 Published: In re Westenberg, 365 B.R. 895 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2007).

Chapter 7 trustee brought an adversary proceeding to avoid a mortgage lien.  The court denied the trustee's motion for summary judgment; because no bona fide purchaser could have acquired a lien superior to the secured creditor, the perfection of the mortgage was not a preferential transfer.  In re Snezana & Boban Ljubic, Case No. 03-32636, Virginia E. George, Trustee v. Guaranty Mortgage Co., Adv. No. 04-2213 Published: In re Ljubic, 362 B.R. 914 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2007).

Chapter 7 trustee filed an adversary proceeding to avoid a mortgage lien.  The court denied the trustee's motion for partial summary judgment; issue of fact remained regarding whether or not perfection of secured interest was substantially contemporaneous with execution of mortgage.  In re Richard S. Radbil, Case No. 04-25643, Virginia E. George, Trustee v. Argent Mortgage Co., et al., Adv. No. 05-2311 Published: In re Radbil, 364 B.R. 355 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2007).

Player who was injured during prepetition hockey game when he was punched by the chapter 7 debtor in head, face, and nose brought an adversary proceeding for a determination that potential obligations owed him by the debtor were excepted from the discharge.  The court granted the player's motion for summary judgment.  The debtor's no contest plea to charges of misdemeanor battery and disorderly conduct did not have an issue preclusive effect under Wisconsin law. Nevertheless, the state court's findings in a separate personal injury action about the intentional nature of the debtor's conduct, along with the debtor's statements to his insurer established the willful and malicious nature of the debtor's actions.   In re Matthew J. Blair, Case No. 05-41949, Dustin Elbing v. Debtor, Adv. No. 06-2135 Published: In re Blair, 359 B.R. 233 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2007).

Chapter 13 trustee filed an objection to confirmation of the debtor's plan, arguing it did not comply with the equal payment requirement of sec. 1325(a)(5)((B)(iii)(I).  The plan provided for monthy payments at the rate due under the mortage with a balloon payment at the end of the 60-month term.  The court overruled the objection because the secured creditor accepted the  plan.  In re Darrin J. Schultz, Case No. 06-24781 Published: In re Schultz, 363 B.R. 902 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2007).

Because hearing was not held within 30 days of petition date, automatic stay was not extended in debtor's second bankruptcy case. (This decision is a court minute decision, only.)  In re Douglas C. Wilke, Case No. 06-26904

Chapter 7 trustee brought an adversary proceeding to set aside alleged fraudulent transfers. The debtor's principal was found liable for avoided transfer, but bank that structured the complex prepetition sales transaction was not.  In re Art Unlimited, Case No. 02-23992, Neil McKloskey, Trustee v. Galva Foundry Co., et al., Adversary No. 04-2098 Published: In re Art Unlimited, LLC, 356 B.R. 700 (Bankr. E. D. Wis. 2006).

Creditor whose claim was secured by purcahse-money security interest in motor vehicle that chapter 13 debtors had acquired for their personal use by debt incurred within 910 days of petition date objected to confirmation of the debtors' plan. The court sustained the objection, finding the Till analysis applied to establish the interest rate on the secured claim at "prime rate plus risk factor" over the life of the plan, even though the original contract provided for 0% interest. In re John D. Brill & Kimberly M. Quass-Brill, Case No. 06-21600 Published: In re Brill, 350 B.R. 853 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006). 

State court judgment deemed nondischargeable pursuant to s. 523(a)(4) due to issue preclusion. In re Tina Dawn Hilbelink, Case No. 05-30111, Alma P. Leach v. Debtor, Adv. No. 06-2178

Trustee filed complaint to avoid mortgage as preferential transfer under s. 547(b).  Trustee entitled to judgment; avoided mortgage was preserved for benefit of estate.  Trustee was not entitled to recover the amount of payments received by defendant postpetition. In re Anthony & Jennifer Rodriguez, Case No. 05-34551, Michael F. Dubis, Trustee v. Homecomings Financial Network, et al., Adv. No. 06-2028

Debtor's was allowed to exempt his interest in Simplified Money Purchase Keogh Plan under Wis. Stat. s. 815.18(3)(j).  In re Boden & Lundi Perry, Case No. 05-24027

Chapter 7 trustee brought an adversary proceeding to avoid lender's mortgage lien.  The court granted the lender's motion for summary judgment.  The prepetition mortgage was invalid due to the failure of the debtor's spouse to sign the mortgage.  Nevertheless, the secured creditor was equitably subrogated to the earlier mortgage, and the trustee as a hypothetical bona fide purchaser did not defeat its rights under that mortgage. In re Rick E. Larson, Case No. 04-34605, Larry Liebzeit, Trustee v. Universal Mortgage Corporation v. Debtor, Adversary No. 05-2030 Published: In re Larson, 346 B.R. 486 (Bankr. E. D. Wis. 2006).

Due to court's findings of fact regarding value of debtors' real estate and amount due under land contract, debtors' objection to trustee's intent to sell property was overruled. In re Bernard & Mary Guelig, Case No. 05-33634

Debtors plan, which proposed to contribute such portion of $15,000 proceeds of sale of real estate as necessary to complete the plan, failed to meet the requirements of 11 U.S.C. s. 1325(b)(1)(B). In re David & Christine LeFeber, Case No. 05-28540

Defendant bank was granted summary judgment on fraudulent transfer cause of action; defense of accord and satisfaction was inapplicable because the amount the debtors owed the bank at the time of the prepetition transfer was not in dispute. In re Jeffrey & Penny Munsch, Case No. 05-23178, Neil McKloskey, Trustee v. Guaranty Bank, Adversary No. 05-2437

Debtors' claim of exemption of land contract payments as business property was disallowed.  Debtors were allowed an exemption in 75% of the interest, but not principal due and owing under land contract as of the petition date; instead limited to interest due for one week and to extent reasonably necessary for support of debtors.  Any claimed amount in excess was disallowed. In re Russell & Donna Nelson, Case No. 05-40908

Chapter 7 debtor, an inmate at correctional facility that had filed his petition pro se, sought a determination that the petition was "filed" prior to the effective date of BAPCPA, so that he did not have to comply with the credit counseling requirement. The court found the "prison mailbox rule" applied to the filing of a bankruptcy petition; thus, the pro se prisoner's petition was deemed "filed" on that date he delivered the petition and related documents to prison authorities for forwarding to the bankruptcy clerk. In re Michael R. Luedtke, Case No. 05-45087 Published: In re Luedtke, 337 B.R. 918 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006).

Chapter 7 trustee brought an adversary proceeding to avoid, on a preference theory, loan payments that the debtors had made to their parents during the one-year preference period.  The court granted summary judgment to the parents because the prepetition transfers met the requirements for the new value defense. In re Ronald & Deanne Schabel, Case No. 04-35733, Neil McKloskey, Trustee v. Henry & Diane Schabel, Adv. No. 05-2270 Published: In re Schabel, 338 B.R. 376 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2005).

Judgment for restitution was nondischargeable obligation pursuant to 11 U.S.C. s. 523(a)(7). In re Dennis Gerard Etzel, Case No. 05-24211, American Standard Ins. Co. v. Debtor, Adv. No. 05-2337

Damages assessed against defendant for violation of automatic stay. In re Mark & Marlene Brewer, Case No. 03-33181, Debtors v. QC Financial Services, Inc., Adv. No. 03-2532

Because secured creditor did not give up its right to foreclose on the mortgage when it sought and obtained a personal judgment against the debtors, the debtor's objection to the creditor's proof of claim was overruled. In re Peggie Mae Bolton, Case No. 05-26436

Chapter 13 debtors objected to the proof of claim filed by a creditor, based on the retail value of the vehicle securing it when the petition was filed. The court sustained the objection in part.  For purposes of determining the creditor's secured claim, the value of the vehicle damaged in a postpetition accident was established at liquidation value as of the petition date. In re John & Jennifer Engebregtsen, Case No. 05-27818 Published: In re Engebregtsen, 337 B.R. 677 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006).

Chapter 13 Trustee's objection to priority claim filed by debtor on behalf of city for unpaid municipal services was sustained. In re Gertrude Walker, Case No. 04-23123

Debtor refinanced mortgage with defendant and subsequently filed for relief six days later.  Defendant perfected mortgage twelve days after petition date.  As mortgage was no perfected with the time allowed under sec. 547(e)(2)(A), the recording violated the automatic stay.  Acts done in violation of the stay are void; therefore, the mortgage was unperfected at the time of filing. In re Dana Voelske, Case No. 03-28533, Glenn Givens, Jr., Trustee v. Franlkin Mortgage Funding Corp., Adv. No. 05-2327

In preference adversary filed under sec. 547 and sec. 548, defendant transferee's motion for summary judgment was granted, in part, and denied, in part. In re Art Unlimited, Case No. 02-23992, Neil McKloskey, Trustee v. Galva Foundry Co, Inc., Walter Nocito, & Wells Fargo Bank Wisconsin, Adv. No. 04-2098

Because plaintiff architects were not beneficiaries under state theft by contractor statute, the debtor's obligations to them were dischargeable. In re Paul F. Dinkins, Case No. 04, 28251, Romes Design, Inc. v. Paul F. Dinkins, Adv. No. 04-2229 and Central Consulting Engineers, Ltd. v. Paul F. Dinkins, Adv. No. 04-2230 Published: In re Dinkins, 327 B.R. 918 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2005).

In same case, the court previously determined presentation of post-dated check by the payee after payor filed bankruptcy, and resulting receipt of proceeds, was excepted from the automatic stay (see below).  In this decision, the court found the retention of the proceeds after demand by the debtors was a violation of the stay.  Because the creditor's conduct was egregious and intentional, the debtors were entitled to punitive damages. In re Mark & Marlene Brewer, Case No. 03-33181, Debtors v. QC Financial Services, Inc., Adv. No. 03-2532

Chapter 7 debtors could recover from lienholder postpetition payments made on truck loan prior to avoidance of security interest by trustee. In re Daniel P. & Miranda J. Huitema, Case No. 03-33310

Because debtor’s future interest in spendthrift trust was not property of the estate, the chapter 7 trustee’s motion for turnover was denied. In re Casey R. Wilbur, Case No. 03-37383

Chapter 7 trustee was granted relief from order of abandonment. Personal property annexed to land was improvement subject to mortgage, precluding avoidance of the creditor’s security interest. In re Chad M. Koenigs, Case No. 04-23111, Paul G. Swanson, Trustee v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation, Adv. No. 04-2263

Plaintiffs’ causes of action under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) survived defendants’ motions to dismiss. In re Paul & Veronique Madel, Case No. 03-32367, Debtors v. GMAC Mortgage Corporation, et al., Adv. No. 04-2060

Chapter 13 debtors brought an adversary proceeding to recover for the creditor's alleged violations of the automatic stay.  The court granted the creditor's motion for summary judgment in part. The creditor's postpetition presentment of a check written prepetition was not a violation of the automatic stay. Genuine issues of fact precluded entry of summary judgment on whether the creditor's refusal to turn over proceeds of the transfer was an excercise of control over property of the estate.  In re Mark & Marlene Brewer, Case No. 03-33181, Debtors v. QC Financial Services, Inc., Adv. No. 03-2532 Published: In re Brewer, 313 B.R. 795 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004).

Chapter 7 debtors refinanced their 1996 Harley Davidson motorcycle prepetition.  Perfection of the motorcycle was untimely during the preference period.  The trustee filed a motion to turn over property for the benefit of the estate.  The lien granted by the debtors to the bank was an avoidable preference and because the debtors had not made any payments to the trustee to satisfy the lien, the trustee was entitled to possession. In re Derrick & Shannon Buchner, Case No. 03-37885

Chapter 13 debtor had two loans with the Farmers Home Administration ("FHA"), which she obtained as part of a divorce settlement.  One loan was subsequently paid in full.  Debtor had not made payments on the second loan for over a year, as she thought the loan had been paid in full.  The debtor objected to both the FHA's proof of claim and motion for relief from the automatic stay.  The Court allowed the claim for the pre- and postpetition amounts and further allowed the filing of a supplemental claim for postpetition arrearages.  The motion for relief was denied because the debtor had equity in the property and the property was necessary for effective reorganization, subject to the debtor maintaining current payments to the creditors and trustee. In re Linda L. Middaugh, Case No. 02-32054

The chapter 7 trustee filed a no asset report in November 2003, and the discharge was granted and case closed in January 2004.  In March 2004, debtor's counsel advised the trustee that the debtor was to receive previously undisclosed state and federal tax refunds.  The trustee filed a motion to reopen and a motion for turnover of property.  The debtor objected, stating the majority of the refund was generated by earned income credit and child tax credit.  The court found that both types of credit were property of the estate and as such, subject to turnover. In re Tracey Rene Turck, Case No. 03-34679

On remand, the chapter 7 trustee was required to prove the debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for relevant transfers and the debtor was insolvent on the date the transfers were made or became insolvent as a result of the transfers.  The evidence supported the court's previous findings in favor of the trustee and the court denied the defendant's motion for return of the proceeds. In re Donald P. Lomax, Case No. 99-28332, Bruce Lanser, Trustee v. Frank Balistreri, Adv. No. 01-2496

Debtors claimed any recovery they received from third party complaint was not part of the bankruptcy estate, but rather for the beneficiaries of a trust.  The bank argued, and the court agreed, that based on the debtors' claim, the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction; therefore, the third party complaint was dismissed.  In re Richard & Barbara Fisher, Case No. 02-22055, Monroe Equipment, Inc. v. Debtors v. Milwaukee Western Bank, Adv. No. 02-2196 

The State of Minnesota Department of Revenue amended its claim requesting unpaid state sales tax, accrued interest and penalties.  The debtor objected to the penalty portion of the claim, stating the punitive aspect of the claim should not take priority over the allowed claims of unsecured creditors.  The court overruled the debtor's objection, finding the doctrine of equitable subordination was inapplicable. In re Arrowhead Systems, LLC, Case No. 02-20147

Debtor purchased a motor vehicle prepetition and GMAC was granted a security interest.  The title application listed GMAC as the secured party.  Baird, Inc., a third party agent under contract with the Wisconsin Department of Transportation, entered the title information into the state's database, omitting GMAC as the secured party. The chapter 7 trustee sought to avoid the unperfected security interest, recover payments made to GMAC postpetition, and preserve the remaining amount due for the benefit of the estate.  The court granted GMAC's motion for summary judgment, finding because an agent of the state made the mistake, the savings clause was implicated and GMAC's lien was perfected under state law. In re Julie A. Kahl, Case No. 01-32245, Paul G. Swanson, Trustee v. GMAC, Adv. No. 02-2207 Published: In re Kahl, 316 B.R. 919 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2003).

In May 2000, the defendant loaned $25,000 to an LLC, of which the debtors were the sole members. A key loan provision stated that if the loan was not paid in full, on demand, the defendant had to option to acquire a 99% equity interest in the LLC.  In June 2000, the defendant demanded payment in full. Because the debtors were unable to pay in full, the defendant acquired a 99% equity interest in the LLC.  Over a year later, the debtors filed chapter 7 and the trustee sought to recover the interest as a preferential or fraudulent transfer.  The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the loans were made to the LLC, not the debtors.  The court denied the motion, finding genuine issues of material fact existed; namely, when the transfer was made, whether the debtors were insolvent at the time of transfer, whether the transfer could be avoided as a preference, the intent of the debtors, and the fair market value of the interest. In re Steven & Mary Anderson, Case No. 01-33143, Andrew Herbach, Trustee v. Phyllis Anderson, Adv. No. 02-2163

Chapter 7 debtor, who owned a home in Wisconsin with his wife, filed his case in the Southern District of Florida, where he resided.  Divorce commenced post-bankruptcy filing.  The debtor claimed no exemptions in the Wisconsin home in which his wife and children still lived.  The trustee filed an adversary proceeding to obtain appoval to sell the interests of the both the estate and spouse.  The adversary proceeding was transferred to Wisconsin and the court found the trustee was authorized to sell the former Wisconsin community property of the debtor and non-filing spouse, as well as administer proceeds. The court further held that any transfer of the property pursuant to a decree of dissolution was void. In re Teddy Hubert Morgan, Case No. 01-21216-BKC-RBR, Soneet R. Kapila, Trustee v. Moritta Wilson Morgan, Adv. No. 01-2963 Published: In re Morgan, 286 B.R. 678 (Bankr. E. D. Wis. 2002).

Because the chapter 13 trustee was unable to return funds to the debtor after his case was dismissed without confirmation of a plan, the funds were paid to the Clerk of Bankruptcy Court.  Over two years later, an entity fileda petition for payment of the unclaimed monies on behalf of the debtor.  The IRS opposed the release of the funds to the debtor, asserting it was entitled to turnover of the funds due to the debtor's outstanding tax liens.  The court agreed and directed payment of the unclaimed funds to the IRS. In re Johnnie L. Brown, Case No. 98-31716 Published: In re Brown, 280 B.R. 231 (Bankr. E. D. Wis. 2002).

Prior to the filing of an involuntary chapter 7, debtor and its affiliate had entered into an agreement to sell the debtor's assets as a going concern. As a result of the involuntary petition, the purchaser refused to close the sale. The court suspended the case to allow the debtor to convey substantially all of its assets to the purchaser.  Upon completion of the sale, the order for relief was entered.  During the gap period, the claimant entered into a retainer agreement with the debtor for the purpose of conducting negotiations for the sale.  The trustee opposed the claimant's priority claim, arguing the debt was not incurred in the ordinary course.  The court found because the debtor was not in the business of selling substantially all of its assets, the sale of assets was not in the ordinary course and the claimant was not entitled to priority under sec. 502(f). In re Lappin Electric Co., Case No. 97-26130

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing res judicata and collateral estoppel prevented litigation in the sec. 523(a)(2)(A) proceeding of the issues raised in prior actions.  With respect to collateral estoppel, the court determined the debtor had been provided an adequate opportunity to obtain full and fair adjudication of the merits in the state court actions, thereby giving the prior judgments preclusive effect. The court further found prior litigation had established the debtor made a representation to the plaintiff and the plaintiff justifiably relief on the representation to its detriment. Whether or not the representation was false or that the debtor intended to deceive the plaintiff were not subject to issue preclusion and had to be litigated. In re Crazy Jim, Case No. 01-24180, Auction Associates v. Crazy Jim, Adv. No. 01-2616

The chapter 11 debtor commenced an adversary proceeding against the City, seeking a declaratory judgment that certain prepetition obligations of the debotr for the payment of water and sewer charges were unsecured claims pursuant to sec. 545(2). The City asserted the prepetition charges were a lien upon the debtor's property at the time the services were incurred under state law. The court determined the prepetition charges were not a lien on the date of filing, and any purported lien on the real estate sold by the debtor could be avoided. In re United States Leather, Inc., Case No. 00-21375, United States Leather, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, Adv. No. 01-2556 Published: In re U.S. Leather, Inc., 271 B.R. 306 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2001).

Defendant was hired to tear down and replace debtor's garage.  Debtor never paid for the work and the defendant obtained an unsecured construction lien. After the debtor filed a chapter 7 petition, he commenced an adversary proceeding to declare the lien void under sec. 506(d). On summary judgment, the debtor argued he was not seeking avoidance of the lien, but rather wanted the lien declared void as a matter of law. The court dismissed the adversary proceeding, finding under Dewnup v. Timm, the lien passed through bankruptcy unaffected. In re Larry M. Watts, Case No. 01-21368, Larry M. Watts v. J.D. Griffiths Co., Adv. No. 01-2583

The chapter 7 trustee filed an adversary proceeding seeking to avoid an alleged preferential payment to an insider pursuant to sec. 547(b).  The defendant filed for summary judgment on the issue of whether the doctrine of earmarking applied to defeat avoidance by the trustee, as a matter of law.  Prepetition, the defendant had loaned the debtor $50,000, to be repaid with the proceeds from the sale of coffee shop business.  Two months later, the sale closed and the defendant was repaid.  The defendant argued the loan payment did not constitute a preferential transfer due to the equitable doctrine of earmarking.  The trustee argued earmarking was not application because the sale proceeds were paid to the president and majority shareholder of the debtor in his individual capacity, who in turn deposited the proceeds into the debtor's account before paying the defendant.  The trustee also argued the payment to the defendant diminished the estate.  The court found the estate was not dimished by payment of the debt as the money would never have come into the estate had it not been targeted for the debt to the defendant.  Because the trustee failed to meet his burden that there was a transfer of the debtor's interest in property to the creditor, the adversary proceeding was dismissed.  In re Fox Bay Entertainment, Inc., Case No. 99-22637, John M. Scaffidi, Trustee v. Bonnie K. Smith, Adv. No. 00-2149

In this sec. 523(a)(4) action, the plaintiff, a material supplier, alleged the debtor, a general contractor, diverted funds due the plaintiff for goods and services rendered for a contruction project, in violation of the theft by contractor statute, sec. 799.02(5), Wis. Stats. The court was satisfied that a relationship between the contractor and supplier existed and that funds for improvements passed from the owners to the contractor and did not reach the plaintiff.  The plaintiff was entitled to the same percentage of its claim as the percentage of the contract that the debtor received from the owners and was granted a nondischargeable judgment for that amount.  In re Thomas & Laura Von Eiff, Case No. 99-29495, Christiansen Building Center, Inc. v. Thomas Von Eiff, Adv. No. 99-2528

The plaintiff, an owner of a shopping center, alleged the debtor, a real estate developer, participated in intentional acts of conspiracy and antitrust violations to deprive it of its property or to cause great damage to its property, resulting in a nondischargeable obligation under sec. 523(a)(6). The debtor contended the plaintiff's per se analysis of the parties' business arrangement should be rejected in favor of a "rule of reason" analysis of antitrust violations and an analysis of competition enhancing factors.  Based on the debtor's own statements, the court deemed his actions against the plaintiff were willful and showed clear malice.  The court was also satisfied that the debtor's deliberate side deal with the plaintiff's anchor tenant to leave the space but retain the lease, and the resulting reduction of value of the satellite space, constituted price fixing and a per se violation of antitrust laws; therefore, the debtor's liability to the plaintiff was excepted from discharge. In re Frank Pio Crivello, Case No. 92-27252, Century Shopping Center Fund I Ltd. P'ship v. Debtor, Adv. No. 94-2346

Plaintiffs brought an adversary proceeding against the chapter 7 debtor to except from discharge under sec. 523(a)(2)(B) an unsecured obligation arising from the sale of the plaintiffs' real estate to the debtor's LLC.  The court determined that (1) a written financial statement from the debtor was provided to the plaintiffs and was used to procure financing for the LLC from the plaintiffs, (2) the financial statement painted a substantially untruthful picture of the debtor's financial condition, (3) the plaintiffs' reliance on the financial statement was reasonable, (4) the debtor caused the financial statement to be made, and (5) the financial disclosure was provided with the intent to deceive.  The debtor's liability to the plaintiffs was excepted from discharge. In re Joseph & Mary Setnicar, Case No. 99-22360, Carol Hartson & Charlotte Nelson v. Joseph Setnicar, Adv. No. 99-2280

Plaintiffs, homeowners, alleged the chapter 7 debtors, doing business as a construction company, used monies paid to the latter for purposes other than paying the material supplier, in violaiton of the theft by contractor statute, sec. 799.02(5), Wis. Stats., resulting in a nondischargeable obligation under section 523(a)(4). The court found that because there was no contract between the plaintiffs and the material supplier, the plaintiffs had no right to sue on the material supplier's behalf.  Although the plaintiffs may have had a claim for defective product against the debtors, such a claim was dischargeable.  The adversary proceeding was dismissed. In re Harry & Bernice Pegelow, Case No. 99-25383, Scott & Kerry Mason v. Debtors, Adv. No. 99-2407

Court entered, sua sponte, an order modifying the stay to all the plaintiffs to proceed with an action against the chapter 7 debtors in state court.  The order allowed the state court to determine liability, if any, but the plaintiffs could not execute on a judgment until the bankruptcy court determined dischargeability.  Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion to vacate the sua sponte order and have the action heard by the bankruptcy court.  The court denied the motion as the facts pointed to the plaintiffs' forum shopping and dissatisfaction with the state court judge, which were not grounds for revoking the abstention order. In re Albert & Sylvia Toeller, Case No. 98-31721, Edward & Cindy Graff v. Debtors, Adv. No. 99-2072

Chapter 7 trustee filed notice of his intent to compromise marshaling claim and creditors objected.  The court held that the trustee's proposed compromise of marshaling claims against secured creditor was in the best interests of the estate.  The creditor's claims were secured both by interest in assets of debtor and interest in assets of sister company, pursuant to which trustee, in return for $15,000 payment from sister company, gave up any claim he had to compel creditor to look first to assets of sister company before it tried to recover from assets of debtor's estate. In re Universal Electric Sign Co., Case No. 99-30673 Published: In re Universal Electric Sign Co., 255 B.R. 732 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2000).

Chapter 7 trustee commenced adversary proceeding alleging a payment to the debtor's father was a preferential payment under sec. 547. Pursuant to a family court order, a workers' compensation award to the debtor was transferred the debtor's father, in exchange for his release of a lien on a vehicle awarded to the debtor's ex-spouse. The only element of sec. 547(b) the father disputed was whether the funds transferred constituted "an interest of the debtor in property."  The father reasoned that because the workers' compensation award twas never available to the debtor, she did not have an interest in the property transferred.  The court found in favor of the trustee, determining that an interest in the debtor's property was transferred when the father was paid.  The court also found that none of the defenses available under sec. 547(c) applied as the consideration given by the father at the time the transfer was given to the debtor's former spouse, not to the debtor. The father's claim that the proceeds were exempt was irrelevant because that was not a defense under sec. 547(c) and only a debtor could claim exemptions. In re Krystal Papcke, Case No. 99-24700, Bruce Lanser, Trustee v. Russell Papcke, Adv. No. 99-2381

In sec. 523(a) nondischargeability action, plaintiff alleged the chapter 7 debtor violated the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, sec. 134.90, Wis. Stats., in connection with his employment with the plaintiff, a pizza franchise.  The court found the plaintiff lacked standing to prosecute a cause of action with respect to the pizza dough recipe because the debtor obtained the recipe prior to his employment with the plaintiff.  The court also found the plaintiff failed to prove it was entitled to relief with respect to the misappropriation of its business manuals and cost calculations.  [Previously, on summary judgment, damages related to the plaintiff's cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty were excepted from the debtor's discharge under sec. 523(a)(4).] In re Kenneth & Deborah Szostek, Case No. 99-23910, Bayoff Enterprises, Inc. v. Kenneth Szostek, Adv. No. 99-2206

Chapter 7 trustee filed adversary proceeding seeking to avoid the debtor's transfer of a lien on a her vehicle to the defendant.  The trustee also sought turnover of the lien and postpetition payments made by the debtor to the defendant. Within 90 days prepetition, the debtor borrowed funds from the defendant to obtain the vehicle. The defendant's lien interest was not perfected until more than 20 days after the debtor took possession of the vehicle. The court avoided the defendant's security interest; however, the defendant was not required to turn over the postpetition payments made by the debtor.  Additionally, the parties' defective reaffirmation agreement did not effect the outcome of the proceeding. In re Tamera Rich, Case No. 97-27648, Todd Esser, Trustee v. Arcadia Financial, Ltd., Adv. No. 99-2131

Creditor filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay.  The chapter 7 trustee objected to the motion, as well as to the creditor's secured claim.  The trustee alleged the creditor did not properly perfect its lien in the debtor's vehicle and that the lien was void as to the trustee.  The creditor argued its security interest was valid because a properly perfected security interest was assigned to it from the prior lender and that perfection remained on the vehicle's title. The court found that since the release of the prior lender's lien was held by the creditor and never recorded, it was insufficient to provide notice of perfection. Because the obligation to perfect a security interest is wholly upon the secured party, the creditor's defense that the debtor failed to deliver the certificate of title was rejected. Because the lien was unperfected, it was avoidable by the trustee and the claim was deemed unsecured. In re Cezary Zawadzinski, Case No. 98-31738

Chapter 7 trustee brought adversary proceeding against oversecured creditor, alleging an early termination fee of $225,000 provided for in parties' loan agreement for debtor's line of credit and paid by the purchaser of debtor's assets was an unreasonable charge and, thus, a voidable transfer.  On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court held (2) early termination fee was a reasonable calculation of potential damages, satisfying the requirements of Illinois law and (2) early termination fee, which represented approximately 5.9% of the principal loan amount and which had been negotiated by sophisticated parties represented by competent counsel, was reasonably under the applicable provision of the Code. In re Lappin Electric Co., Inc., Case No. 97-26130, Patrick Noonan, Trustee v. Fremont Financial, Adv. No. 99-220 Published: In re Lappin Elec. Co., 245 B.R. 326 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2000).

Counsel for chapter 12 oversecured creditors filed a claim for attorney's fees and other charges under sec. 506(b) and pursuant to existing loan agreements. The debtors objected to the claim, arguing they attempted to cooperate with the creditors despite the creditors' unreasonably demands for inspection of collateral and production of non-existent documents. While the court agreed with the creditors that the debtors lacked responsiveness to reasonable requests and lacked an explanation for the loss of assets or acquisition of funds, counsel for the creditors responded in a hyperactive and unproductive manner.  The court reduced the attorney's fees by 50%.  In re Randy & Kristine Gomm, Case No. 97-30695

Plaintiff moved to reopen adversary proceeding and debtor objected, claiming the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion prevented the plaintiff from seeking judgment against him. The court found the previous order dismissing the adversary only required a judgment in state court and a motion before the bankruptcy court.  The court further found issue preclusion did not apply because no issues had been litigated in state court. The court rejected the debtor's argument that the plaintiff should have included the debtor in the state court action because the debtor had no right to dictate the plaintiff's strategy or choice of forum.  In re Frank Pio Crivello, Case No. 92-27252, Century Shopping Center Fund I Ltd. P'ship v. Debtor, Adv. No. 94-2346

Chapter 13 debtor objected to the secured status of a claim based on a judgment lien. The creditor argued the debtor could not claim a homestead exemption in property he did not reside in at the time judgment was obtained and the judgment superceded the debtor's exempt interest at the petition date. The debtor argued the creditor was precluded from objecting to the exemption since no timely objection was filed by the creditor or trustee. The court determined the debtor's homestead exemption superceded the judgment lien.  Under sec. 506(a), the claim was an allowed secured claim to the extent of the creditor's interest in the property, and was an allowed unsecured claim for the balance. In re Shevan C. Joseph, Case No. 98-28086

The parties filed post-trial requests for reconsideration of the court's ruling on nondischargeable damages under sec. 523(a)(2)(A). The plaintiffs requested the court reconsider its denial of recovery of attorney's fees incurred as a result of the wrongful conduct of the debtor.  The debtor requested the court amend its previous award for damages. The court held that the plaintiffs' legal fees, incurred in the fraud litigation, was not recoverable. Because a portion of the damage award was derivative of the debtor's acts against the plaintiffs' corporation, it could not be awarded to them personally and the judgment against the debtor was reduced. In re Todd W. Hansen, Case No. 97-25273, Alan & Barbara Schroeder v. Debtor, Adv. No. 97-2459

Chapter 7 trustee objected to the debtors' exemption in potential proceeds of a personal injury lawsuit or settlement under sec. 522(d)(11)(E), stating "any loss of future earnings" should be calculated as of the date of the bankruptcy filing.  The debtors contended that the debtor-wife suffered a loss of future earnings as of her date of injury.  Under Wisconsin law, lost future earnings are determined as of the date the damages are assessed, either by verdict or settlement.  Loss of past earnings are calculated from the date of injury to the time of verdict or settlement.  In this case, the debtors' schedules reflected that the debtor-wife was not working prior to her injury.  The debtors' schedules also reflected expenses exceeded income. The statute only allowed an exemption "to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor or any dependant of the debtor."  As that amount could not be determined until the amount of the award was known, the trustee's objection was held in abeyance pending the outcome of the debtor's personal injury claim. In re Kenneth & Debra Beattie, Case No. 98-30856

Chapter 7 debtor moved for contempt and sanctions against judgment creditors for their alleged violation of the discharge injunction in failing to release a lien creating a cloud on the debtor's title to community property awarded to her by the divorce court.  The bankruptcy court held that while the creditors having community claims against both the debtor and her nonfiling spouse may have received a technically deficient notice of the debtor's bankruptcy, inasmuch as the notice failed to identify the debtor's estranged husband as a nonfiling spouse, the creditors nevertheless had sufficient notice of the relationship between the parties, and were barred by the debtor's discharge from proceeding against after-acquired community property of the debtor and her spouse. However, no sanctions were imposed for the creditors' alleged violation of the discharge injunction. In re Michelle Schmiedel, Case No. 94-21332 Published: In re Schmiedel, 236 B.R. 393 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1999).

Chapter 11 debtor filed a motion for an order determining the debtor's "disbursements" for purposes of calculating the amount of post-confirmation fees owed under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1930(a)(6) included only payments made by the reorganized debtor pursuant to the plan and not any other post-confirmation payments. The U.S. Trustee objected, asserting fees due were based on all disbursements, including all operating costs, of the reorganized debtor. The debtor countered that charging it for post-confirmation operations actually undermined its chances for future success.  The court indicated the debtor may have been correct, however Congress was within its policy making authority to raise funds in the manner afforded under sec. 1930(a)(6).  The fees imposed by sec. 1930(a)(6) were thus determined by reference to all disbursements of any kind made by the debtor until the case was closed. In re United States Leather, Inc., Case No. 98-24997

Chapter 13 trustee objected to confirmation of the debtor's proposed debt adjustment plan. The court held that the ex-wife of the debtor's spouse had an allowable claim for past due child support against the debtor's estate, by virtue of her state law right to enforce the claim against the debtor's property, i.e., against the debtor's marital property interest in income of the spouse.  However, the fact that the ex-wife had an allowable claim for child support against the debtor's estate did not make the ex-wife's child, with respect to whom support was owed, a "child of the debtor," so as to make the ex-wife's claim a priority claim and to render the debtor's plan infeasible.  The trustee's objection was overruled. In re Kathleen Pfalzgraf, Case No. 98-25982 Published: In re Pfalzgraf, 236 B.R. 390 (Bankr. E. D. Wis. 1999).

Chapter 7 debtor's counsel filed an application for approval of attorney's fees and expenses.  The U.S. Trustee objected to the amount of fees, the failure to provide sufficient detail of certain charges, counsel's nondisclosure of its creditor status or sufficient detail on the fee arrangement.  Counsel argued it never considered itself a creditor as it agreed from the inception of the representation and disclosed that debtor's principal, personally, would pay the fees. The court was satisfied there was sufficient disclosure of the payment arrangement by counsel and imposed no impediment to the retention of the law firm. The court allowed the postpetition fees as requested.  However, because counsel failed to disclose the payment arrangement for prepetition fees, those amounts were disallowed. In re Dynacon Development Corporation, Case No. 97-27874

Chapter 11 debtor commenced an adversary proceeding for breach of construction contracts in connection with five condominium projectes. Each party to each contract alleged the other parties breached first, most and worst; although all parties breached at some point. On the Bouraxis properties, the debtor breached by failing to pay subcontractors; Boraxis breached by allowing the insurance to lapse on a project and by terminating the debtor on all projects after the latter exercised its right to demand assurance of payment. On the Zignego projects, the debtor breached by failing to pay subcontractors and not completing projects timely;  Zignego breached by bypassing the debtor and paying the subcontractors directly. Ultimately, the court found that Zignego had allowed claims against the debtor and the debtor was entitled to a judgment against the Bouraxis defendants. In re Russ James & Associates, Case No. 97-25972, Debtor v. River Park Meadows Ltd. P'ship, et al., Adv. No. 97-2474 and Adv. No. 97-2474 supplement.

Prepetition, the uninsured chapter 13 debtor was involved in a collision involving multiple vehicles.  While litigation was pending in state court to determine damages and liabilities, an injured party and his insurance company filed claims against the debtor's estate.  The injured party settled with a third party's insurer for $250,000, but preserved his rights against its uninsured motorist insurance carrier and the debtor. The claim against the injured party's insurer went to arbitration wherein it was determined that total damages were only $131,000.  While the claimant asserted he was entitled to assert his claim against the estate, the debtor argued the claimant was overpaid and payments made during the plan should be returned.  The bankruptcy court was unable to quantify the claim without knowing the percentage of the debtor's negligence and matters were set for further proceedings. In re Charles R. Cole, Case No. 94-27002

The matter was remanded from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Upon the hearing for final compensation, the bankruptcy court had revoked the employment order for chapter 7 debtor's counsel and denied compensation in its entirety, finding that counsel was not a disinterested person and that the firm willfully failed to disclose critical facts and connections with the debtor. After appeals, the case was remanded for a new hearing on whether counsel was entitled to any compensation under sec. 328(c). The bankruptcy court concluded the original ruling revoking the appointment of counsel was correct and counsel was not entitled to any fees. In re Frank Pio Crivello, Case No. 92-27252

Chapter 13 debtor filed a motion for contempt against a creditor for violating the permanent injunction under sec. 524(a)(2) by continuing collection activities with respect to a prepetition discharged debt. The creditor took efforts to recover its collateral post-discharge when it believed it had retained a valid lien in the debtor's vehicle. The court denied the motion because the creditor did not have actual knowledge of the bankruptcy in order to file a proof of claim. The other unsecured creditors received 100% of their filed claims, but this creditor did not have a similar opportunity. Therefore, the lien survived the discharge and the unsecured claim was not discharged. In re Charlet M. Harmon, Case No. 96-20834

After its application for employmnet was denied on the ground that it was disinterested, counsel filed a motion for compensation for services it provided to the chapter 11 debtor before its application was denied. The bankruptcy court held that services provided by counsel could be compensated as necessary costs of preserving the estate. In re Milwaukee Engraving Co., Inc., Case No. 98-21027 Published: In re Milwaukee Engraving Co., Inc., 230 B.R. 370 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1998).

The U.S. Trustee objected to counsel for the chapter 11 official committee of unsecured creditors' application for an order approving a compromise and settlement of its amended claim. The claim was for post-confirmation fees totaling $205,607, incurred in finalizing a settlement, preparing its final fee application, defending its final fee application, and for other "supplemental administrative services." After objections to the claim were filed, the banks and post-confirmation committee agreed to settle the matter with the unsecured creditors committee counsel by allowing an administrative claim in the amount of $36,800. The court approved the settlement, finding the integrity of the negotiation process had not been compromised and all of the parties had been effectively represented. In re J H Collectibles, Inc., Case No. 96-28214

Neighbor brought an adversary proceeding against the chapter 7 debtor-property owner, seeking determinations of liability and nondischargeability with respect to potential obligations arising from the debtor's conduct in a state court property dispute. The bankruptcy court dismissed the complaint.  Under Wisconsin law, the debtor was entitled to absolute witness immunity for statements he made in an affidavit submitted in a third-party's state court against against the neighbor seeking to enjoin the neighbor from building a two-story home.  There was no exception to the discharge, notwithstanding the debtor's willful and malicious harm to the neighbor's interest and the substantial damage that resulted. In re Richard & Kay Rieger, Case No. 96-22013, Gerald Niedert v. Richard Rieger, Adversary No. 96-2440 

Chapter 7 debtor filed a motion for contempt against credit card company for violating the permanent injunction under sec. 524(a)(2) by continuing with collection activities relating to a prepetition debt.  The creditor contended it was seeking to collect a postpetition obligation. The debtor had filed her petition on October 9th at 9:57 am. Also on October 9th, the debtor deposited a $750 cash advance check from the creditor at her bank. The check was honored October 11th.  The court determined the transfer occurred postpetition, making the obligation postpetition, as well.  Because the creditor did not violate the discharge injunction, the debtor's motion for contempt was denied. In re Denise Harrison, Case No. 96-28304 

Counsel for the chapter 11 official committee of unsecured creditors filed its final fee application in the total amount of $840,119.24, a portion of which had been approved on an interim basis. A trial was held on the creditors' and U.S. Trustee's objections.  The court determined that the fees requested for committee meetings and relations was bordering on the ridiculous and reduced the amount requested by 50%. Second, the fees requested for work done on the plan and disclosure statement was reduced by 40% due to the abrasiveness of committee counsel and its unwillingness to negotiate terms. Third, the fees requested for work done on cash collateral issues was reduced by 20% as the court felt the amount requested was excessive. Fourth, the fees requested in connection with the sale and sale procedures was reduced by 20% as there were more efficient ways to have reached the end result.  Finally, the court reduced counsel's blended rate on the remaining fees by 15% to put it in line with the blended rate of debtor's counsel.  After the aforementioned reductions, the court awarded committee counsel final fees and costs in the amount of $641,832.22. In re J H Collectibles, Inc., Case No. 96-28214

Chapter 7 debtor's ex-employee brought an adversary proceeding to except a debt from discharge as one for the debtor's "willful and malicious injury" to her person.  On the ex-employee's motion for summary judgment based on the preclusive effect of a state agency action, the court held that the mere fact that the debtor was not represented by an attorney in the administrative proceedings before the Equal Rights Division of the Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations did not prevent the bankruptcy court from giving preclusive effect the the final agency decision that the debtor had sexually harassed his former employee. The agency action collaterally estopped the debtor from disputing the "willful and malicious" nature of his acts, for debt dischargeability purposes. In re Isaac Wilson, Case No. 96-29993, Gaile Biggers v. Debtor, Adversary No. 97-2094 Published: In re Wilson, 216 B.R. 258 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1997).

Chapter 7 debtors filed a motion for turnover of funds which the trustee had recovered as a preference from the bank, arguing the funds were exempt under sec. 522(g) because the bank's application of the funds to various unsecured debts was involuntary.  The trustee argued the preferential prepetition transfers to the bank had been voluntary, even though the application was not. The debtors had sold a vacant lot prepetition with the understanding the sale proceeds would be used to pay down their mortgage. The court was satisfied that the allocation of the lot sale proceeds to the unsecured debt was an involuntary payment under sec. 522(g) and that the proceeds could be claimed as exempt, less the reasonable costs of collection by the trustee. In re Douglas & Ramona Hill, Case No. 96-22423

Creditors initiated two separate adversary proceedings seeking to have the chapter 7 debtor's obligations declared nondischargeable. In the first adversary, the creditor claimed the debtor made misrepresentations which caused the creditor to invest $310,000 in the debtor's business. The court found the obligation nondischargeable under sec. 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(B).  In the second adversary, the creditor alleged the debtor diverted corporate funds for his own personal use.  Due to the debtor's clear and callous violation of his fiduciary duty to the creditor, the obligation was deemed nondischargeable under sec. 523(a)(4). In re Debra & Matthew West, Case No. 96-25374, Alby Materials, Inc. v. Debtor, Adv. No. 96-2633, Nienow Engineering Assoc., Inc. v. Debtor, Adv. No. 96-2634

A few months prior to the plan's completion, the chapter 13 debtors moved for an order establishing the extent of the bank's secured claim and for a determination that the secured portion of the claim had been paid in full.  The bank objected to the form of the court's subsequent order, which, after finding that the secured claim had been paid in full, implied that the bank was obligated to release the mortgage lien before receiving payment of the unsecured claim under the plan.  The court held that it would not be fair to deprive the bank of its security at such a late date and, thus, the bank was not required to release its lien. In re Paul & Linda Zakowski, Case No. 92-23686 Published: In re Zakowski, 213 B.R. 1003 (Bankr. E. D. Wis. 1997).

Chapter 7 trustee brought an adversary proceeding against the mortgagee-bank, seeking to avoid an alleged preference received by the bank when it applied proceeds from the sale of a portion of the debtors' real property to the debtors' other outstanding loans with the bank instead of applying the entire proceeds to their mortgage note.  The bank moved for summary judgment.  The court held that the debtors' credit card debt was not secured by the real estate and thus, the bank's application of the sale proceeds to that debt was an avoidable preference. The debtors' ready reserve accounts were included in the mortgage's dragnet clause, so that the bank's application of the sale proceeds to the reserve accounts was not an avoidable preference.  Finally, the bank's application of the sale proceeds toward the debtors' vehicle loan was not an avoidable preference. In re Douglas & Ramona Hill, Case No. 96-22423, Paul G. Swanson, Trustee v. Montello State Bank, Adv. No. 96-2615 Published: In re Hill, 210 B.R. 1016 (Bankr. E. D. Wis. 1997).

A lumber supplier filed an adversary proceeding against the chapter 7 debtors seeking a determination that a stipulated state court judgment was nondischargeable. The debtors used the lumber in construction projects for which the owners had fully paid for, however the debtors failed to remit full payment to the supplier. The court found the amount due for the unpaid invoices was nondischargeable under sec. 523(a)(4).  The attorney's fees and punitive damages portions of the judgment were nondischargeable, as well, under the doctrine of claim preclusion. In re Richard & Mary Ellen Waite, Case No. 95-28196, Virfran, Inc. v. Debtors, Adv. No. 96-2326

Chapter 7 debtor moved to avoid the lien on certain personal goods under section 522(f)(1)(B), and the secured creditor objected.  The court held that the debtor's bicycle was not a "household good" subject to lien avoidance; however, the debtor's extra television set was a "household good" subject to lien avoidance. In re Carrie E. Elst, Case No. 97-20038 Published: In re Elst, 210 B.R. 790 (Bankr. E. D. Wis. 1997).

Creditor commenced an adversary proceeding seeking to have a loan made to the chapter 7 debtor declared nondischargeable. The creditor had loaned the funds to the debtor to enable him to purchase a home when sale proceeds of his old home were inadequate. As realtor on both home sales, the creditor made the loan to save the sales. The creditor alleged the debtor misrepresented the amount of the mortgage on his old home and the creditor lent the money because he believed the debtor would realize sufficient proceeds from the sale of the home.  The court found the obligation was dischargeable because the creditor's reliance on the debtor's estimate of the sale proceeds was not justified. The court also granted the debtor's motion for reasonable attorney's fees because the creditor's cause of action was not substantially justified. In re Timothy Brahm, Case No. 96-22890, Kevin Hibl v. Debtor, Adv. No. 96-2506

Chapter 11 debtor commenced an adversary proceeding to subordinate the defendant's claim, which arose from a guaranteed consulting agreement. After the parties had agreed to sever their business relationship, the debtor agreed to pay the defendant, a former officer of the debtor, for advisory and consulting services. The debtor argued the agreement rendered the debtor insolvent, the defendant's unfair competition after the claim arose led to the debtor's inability to make payments pursuant to the agreement, and the defendant provided no consideration to the debtor in connection with his claim. The court concluded the debtor received no benefit in entering into the consulting agreement with the defendant and subordinated the claim to other general unsecured creditors. In re Concrete Raising Corp., Case No. 95-26272, Debtor v. Tony Zidar, Jr., et al., Adv. No. 96-2028

Chapter 7 trustee brought an adversary proceeding against the debtor's motion and brother, seeking to avoid a prepetition transfer of title to a one-third undivided interest in the property, given to the debtor when he was still a minor. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding the debtor received only bare legal title to the property as a minor. The estate's interest was therefore subject to the mother's equitable lien. In re Jonathan Stoffregen, Case No. 96-22055, Paul G. Swanson, Trustee v. Gertrude & Nathan Stoffregen, Adv. No. 96-2713 Published: In re Stoffregen, 206 B.R. 939 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1997).

Bank filed a motion for allowance and payment of a superpriority administrative claim under secs. 507(b), 507(a)(1), and 503(b). The chapter 7 trustee objected, arguing the bank was not entitled to superpriority because the claim did not arise under sec. 503(b). The court granted the bank's motion, finding the claim was entitled to priority due to the bank having provided new value to the estate by way of providing cash collateral to the debtor, albeit involuntarily. In re American Toy & Furniture Co., Inc., Case No. 92-27686

Chapter 7 trustee commenced an adversary proceeding against two defendants to recover an account receivable. Because the debtor owed the first defendant certain sums and that defendant owed monies to the second defendant, the second defendant argued the amount it owed the debtor should be set off. The court determined that the second defendant failed to proved that the triangular setoff rights fell under the mutuality requirement of sec. 553. The trustee was granted a judgment for the full amount owed the debtor. In re Matrix Interior Supply, Inc., Case No. 95-21120, Paul G. Swanson, Trustee v. First and Portland Corp,, et al, Adv. No. 95-2516

US Trustee moved for reconsideration of the court's order converting the case from chapter 11 to chapter 7 upon the the debtor's motion under sec. 1112(a). The UST argued that, as the debtor was no longer a "debtor in possession" post-confirmation, it no longer had the right to convert  the case under sec. 1112(a). The court found that because the post-confirmation debtor was the same entity as the debtor in possession, the debtor was allowed to convert, post-confirmation, to a chapter 7. In re Imperial Plants, Inc., Case No. 94-21818

Creditor commenced an adversary proceeding seeking to deny the chapter 7 debtor's discharge due to his non-disclosure of personal and financial assets, as well as corporate assets under his control. The court determined the totality of the debtor's mismanagement of both his personal and corporate financial affairs, the debtor 's lack of records, the debtor's concealment of assets, and the debtor's false statements on his schedules and at his meeting of creditors justified the denial of discharge under sec. 727(a)(2), (3), (4)(A), and (7). In re Max Kevin Chulew, Case No. 95-23801, Sierra Center 24, Inc. v. Debtor, Adv. No. 95-2406

Creditor moved for relief from the automatic stay and for an order of payment of secured proceeds held by the chapter 7 trustee. The trustee objected, asking the court to require the creditor to marshal assets of the debtor's principals before resorting to proceeds that were property of the estate. The court sustained the objection. The common debtor requirement of the doctrine of marshaling was met where the principals secured the debtor's note to the creditor with mortgages on their homesteads. The creditor was required to marshal assets with respect to the principals' personal note and was required to satisfy its claim through foreclosure of the principals' real estate even though it was environmentally contaminated. In re Wm. Pietsch Co., Inc., Case No. 95-21279 Published: In re Wm. Pietsch Co., 200 B.R. 207 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1996).

Law firm that had represented the chapter 11 debtor moved for approval of its representation of a defendant in the chapter 7 trustee's preference proceeding after the case was converted.  The court held that the firm could not represent the defendant. In re Peck Foods, Case No. 93-24416, John F. Waldschmidt, Trustee v. Compcare Health Services Ins. Corp., Adv. No. 96-2132 Published: In re Peck Foods, 196 B.R. 434 (Bankr. E. D. Wis. 1996).

US Trustee filed a motion for an order vacating and voiding the court's order approving employment of chapter 11 debtors' counsel for failure to make full disclosure as required under Rules 2014(a) and 2016(b). The firm had required the debtors to pay counsel $3,000 per month which would then be placed into trust to ensure there would be available funds to pay the attorney's fees once approved by the court. The court found the fee arrangement was improper and the firm's initial nondisclosure of the arrangement was an intentional omission; therefore, the firm was disqualified from representing the debtors ab initio. In re Plymouth Creameries, Inc., Case No. 96-20017 & Plymouth Land, Inc., Case No. 96-20018

Chapter 7 trustee filed a motion requesting the court order the trustee of the debtor's family trust to turn over cash assets equal to the debtor's present interest in the value of the trust. The trust trustee argued the express primary purpose of the trust, which was to provide and maintain a residence for the debtor's mother, had to be satisfied prior to a distribution of the trust's assets.  The court determined the chapter 7 trustee was entitled to an order directing the trust trustee to turn over the debtor's proportionate contribution to the trust, which was a 1/7 interest in the trust cash and a 1/14 interest in the trust real estate. In re John Michael Flynn, Case No. 94-24931

Chapter 7 debtors brought an adversary proceeding for an order requiring the IRS to reallocate their tax overpayments to the trust fund portion of their tax liability and for a determination that their tax debts had been discharged. The court held that the individual debtor-partners continued to be liable for all taxes incurred by the debtor-partnership following conversion of its chapter 11 case to chapter 7. Penalties and interest assessed against the debtor-partnership for failing to file partnership informational returns were excepted from the discharge of the individual partners. The court further found no appropriate bankruptcy purpose would be served by requiring the IRS to allocate payments made by the debtor-partnership during its chapter 7 case to the trust fund portion of the taxes, and the debtor were not entitled to designate the application of their income tax overpayments. In re Roger & Iris Kiesner, Case No. 92-23581, Debtors v. IRS, Adv. No. 95-2070; Peggy Kiesner, Case No. 92-23582, Debtor v. IRS, Adv. No. 95-2069 Published: In re Kiesner, 194 B.R. 452 (Bankr. E. D. Wis. 1996).

Last Updated ( Friday, 29 January 2010 )
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Hon. James E. Shapiro

Stanfield v. First Midwest Bank (In re Daniel and Sharon Stanfield) - Debtors commenced an adversary proceeding seeking a determination that the Bank’s mortgage was void because the debtor-husband did not sign the mortgage on a homestead that was collateral for a business loan. Wis. Stats. § 706.02 states that both married persons must join in a conveyance. The bank responded that the mortgage it held was valid due to the “substitute requirements” contained in the statute, which allow extrinsic documents to prove the validity of a mortgage so long as there is intent on the part of the non-signing spouse to mortgage his interest in the property. The court found that no such intent was present. The court also rejected the bank’s argument that it would be inequitable to invalidate the mortgage, noting that the bank is a sophisticated entity and has the obligation to check the requirements of Wisconsin law.

Neary, UST v. Debtor (In re Ricky Leech) - When the UST discovered at the 341 meeting of creditors that debtor had failed to list some jewelry on his schedules, he commenced an adversary proceeding, seeking denial of debtor’s discharge under §§ 727(a)(40(A) and 727(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. The court concluded that in failing to list substantial assets on his schedules, the debtor did intend to actually defraud the trustee and his creditors, or at least acted with reckless disregard for the truth, and should be denied a discharge. The fact that he later amended his schedules to include the omitted assets did not expunge the falsity of his prior oath. The court also rejected debtor’s attempt to shift blame onto his bankruptcy attorney, declaring that debtor has an independent responsibility to verify the information given to his counsel. The court also sustained the chapter 7 trustee’s objection to debtor’s claims of exemption.

Neary, UST v. Debtor (In re Stacie Happel) - Neary, UST v. Debtor (In re Stacie Happel) - Prior to filing her bankruptcy petition, debtor became involved in a business relationship in which her and her “partner” would execute fraudulent loan applications in order to buy residential properties in the Milwaukee area. Title was put in the debtor’s name only, and her “partner” handled everything else. Under the scheme, she received funds from him in order to artificially inflate her bank account and obtain approval of mortgage loans. Immediately after the loans were approved, the funds were removed and returned to her partner. Neither this partnership, the subsequent sale of these various properties, nor the proceeds thereof were disclosed on the debtor’s schedules. The UST objected to a discharge being granted to the debtor based upon §§ 727(a)(3) and 727(a)(4)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. The court concluded that in failing to include key information in her schedules, the debtor demonstrated a reckless disregard for the truth, sufficient to bar a discharge. The court also found that a denial of debtor’s discharge was warranted based on her failure to keep or preserve business records. The court concluded that while debtor may not have been sophisticated in business dealings and was taken advantage of by her partner, she was not an innocent victim.

Debtor v. Creative Loans, LLC, Et Al (In re Eradean Walker) - The debtor, after filing a bankruptcy petition under chapter 13 and without obtaining court approval, entered into agreements, in which she believed she was refinancing the mortgages on her two residential properties. In reality, it was a scam and the agreements transferred her ownership interest in both properties, giving her only the right to occupy the properties as a tenant for a period of 1 year, with no option to re-purchase. The debtor, an elderly widow with a 9th grade education, commenced an adversary proceeding against defendants, seeking the return of her ownership interest in the properties. The court concluded that the debtor never understood what she was signing and found the transactions to have violated § 362(a)(3), as acts to obtain possession of property of the estate, and § 549(a), as a post-petition transfer not authorized by the court.

Neary, UST v. Debtors (In re John and Jennifer McCarthy) - The UST objected to the debtors' discharge based on § 727(a)(4)A) (false oath), § 727(a)(5) (failure to explain loss of assets), and § 727(a)(2) (fraudulent transfer of property within one year of the filing of the bankruptcy). The court concluded that the debtors were the victims of a scam, orchestrated by a clever con artist, and lacked the requisite intent to defraud. The court also found that the debtors transfer of non-exempt funds into exempt funds, totaling approximately $9,900, shortly before filing bankruptcy, was a proper use of pre-petition bankruptcy planning under the particular facts and circumstances of this case. The adversary proceeding was dismissed, and the debtors were granted a discharge.

In re Suzanne Reinstein - Creditor objected to confirmation of debtor's amended chapter 13 plan. Creditor contended that debtor improperly calculated both her housing and transportation expenses and failed to apply all of their disposable income to the plan. The debtor's actual monthly housing expense was $640, but she deducted the entire monthly housing allowance of $712 specified in the Local Standards. The debtor's actual monthly transportation expense totaled $95, but she deducted the $471 specified in the Local Standards monthly transportation allowance. The court found that the expenses in the Local Standards are fixed expenses and apply even if a debtor's actual expenses are lower than the Local Standard allowance. Accordingly, the court overruled creditor's objection to debtor's amended plan.

In re Melanie Collins - Creditor’s motion to dismiss case because of debtor’s failure to provide creditor with a copy of her most recent federal income tax return was denied. The court concluded that the creditor had the ability to obtain the requested tax return by other means, including use of§ 521(g)(2), and that dismissal of case would be unduly harsh.

Case -v- Wells Fargo Bank, NA (In re Case), Johnson -v- US Bank Nat’l Ass’n (In re Johnson), Herrera -v- JPMorgan Chase Bank (In re Herrera), Oven -v- Universal Savings Bank (In re Oven), Newsom -v- Bank of America Corp. (In re Newsom), Jendusa -v- North American Savings Bank, FSB (In re Jendusa), Ruhl -v- HSBC Fin. Corp. and HSBC Mortgage Services (In re Ruhl) - Chapter 13 debtor-mortgagors sued defendant-mortgagees in seven adversary proceedings, which were consolidated, for violating 11 U.S.C. § 1322(e) by wrongfully receiving interest-on-interest on their claims. The debtor-mortgagors sought disgorgement of the wrongfully paid interest-on-interest pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(j) and 1322(e), and claimed abuse of process under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). On remand, the court determined that the adversary proceedings were not moot as to those debtorswho received discharges. The debtors conceded that § 105 did not create a private right of action, and the court dismissed that count. The court found that none of the equitable defenses of judicial estoppel, waiver, or laches raised by the defendants warranted dismissal. However, the court held that the confirmed plans proposed by the debtors are entitled to res judicata effect pursuant to § 1327(a). The court also held that § 1322(e) is a discretionary provision which did not render the orders confirming the plans in each of the adversary proceedings nugatory. As a result, the court dismissed all of the adversary proceedings. *NOTE: This ruling is on appeal*

Kovacs -v- United States of America (In re Kovacs) - Kovacs entered into an offer in compromise (OIC) with the IRS resolving her income tax liabilities for the years 1990 to 1995. Kovacs subsequently defaulted in the terms of the IOC. The IRS terminated the OIC in 1999 and reinstated her liabilities for the tax years in question. On July 3, 2001, Kovacs filed a petition under Chapter 7 and listed the IRS as a creditor and obtained a discharge on October 10, 2001. After Kovacs received her discharge, the IRS mailed to her a series of notices of intent to levy on her assets with respect to these outstanding tax liabilities. The debtor filed an adversary proceeding. At the outset of the trial, the IRS conceded its mistake in determining the dischargeability of the tax liabilities for these years in question and acknowledged it had violated the discharge injunction under § 524 of the Bankruptcy Code. The court concluded that Kovacs was the prevailing party and that the IRS’ breach of § 524(a) was a proximate cause of her damages. However, the court also found that Kovacs Attorneys’ also were mistaken in the impact of her discharge on the tax liabilities, and, in addition, unreasonably protracted the court proceedings in the adversary proceeding. The court concluded that a fair portion of the total damages of $71,901.37 for which the IRS should be liable was $25,000 and stated that a cause of action for violation of the discharge injunction must no be utilized as a profit-making endeavor by the debtor’s attorneys. *NOTE - reversed and remanded.

In re Dunlap - The court held that the use of negative equity financing by the parties in connection with the purchase of a new car and trade-in of an another vehicle did not destroy the purchase money nature of Nissan’s PMSI. The court found that there was a close nexus between the debtors’ acquisition of the new car and the entire secured obligation, which included the negative equity financing. Therefore, pursuant to the hanging paragraph contained in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a), the debtors could not cram down the secured lender’s claim into a secured claim and an unsecured claim under 11 U.S.C. § 506.

Elllsworth -v- Ellsworth (In re Ellsworth)- Plaintiff, former wife of debtor, sought a judgment of nondischargeability against the debtor for failing to promptly notify her of a stock distribution he was to receive and which, under the terms of the parties' marital settlement agreement, was to be sold with the proceeds first to be used to pay certain debts and the balance to be divided by the parties. Instead of promptly notifying the plaintiff, the debtor placed the stock in a margin brokerage account in his sole name, which he used for his personal purposes. By the time the plaintiff finally received notice of the stock distribution, it had dramatically dropped in value (in excess of $442,000). The court found that the actions by the debtor constituted violations of 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and 523(a)(4) (for both defalcation by a fiduciary and embezzlement). The court declined to find that debtor’s conduct constituted a violation of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

 King, Trustee -v- Ernie von Schledorn, Inc. (In re McAlister) - The court found that the refinancing lender did not perfect its security interest under Wis. Stat. § 342.19. The fact that the original certificate of title still had the lien of the fully paid original lender is no defense. The refinancing lender obtained a release from the original lender, and there was no assignment from the original lender to the refinancing lender.

In re Erma L. Averhart - The court held that where a secured creditor files a proof of claim before confirmation, which is at odds with the debtor’s plan as to rate of interest, and the secured creditor fails to object to confirmation, the interest rate in the confirmed plan is controlling. The court also decided that the secured creditor was not denied due process. The argument raised by the secured creditor that established past practice in the Eastern District of Wisconsin required finding that the confirmed plan must yield to the proof of claim was rejected. The court stated that the established past practice was not as firmly entrenched as secured creditor suggested.

Grice -v- WE Energies, et al (In re Grice) - The debtor filed a Chapter 13 case and subsequently converted that case to Chapter 7, wherein she received a discharge . More than two years but less than four years later, the debtor filed a new Chapter 13 case. The court ruled that the four-year waiting period contained within 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f)(1) was applicable to this fact pattern (rather than the two-year waiting period contained within 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f)(2)). Accordingly, the court found that the debtor was ineligible to receive a discharge in the present bankruptcy case because four years had not elapsed since the filing of her prior bankruptcy case.

Maxwell, Trustee -v- Michigan Fidelity Acceptance Corp. (In re Maestas) - The trustee successfully avoided the defendant’s mortgage and preserved it for the benefit of the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 and 551. The trustee then brought a second action to recover a money judgment on the avoided transfer pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 550. The court found that even though res judicata appeared to bar the second action, the "statutory scheme" exception to res judicata was applicable and allowed the trustee to bring a separate action to recover the value of the avoided transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 550. Consequently, the court found that the second action was properly brought and denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for judgment on the pleadings.

Case -v- Wells Fargo Bank, NA (In re Case), Johnson -v- US Bank Nat’l Ass’n (In re Johnson), Herrera -v- JPMorgan Chase Bank (In re Herrera), Oven -v- Universal Savings Bank (In re Oven), Newsom -v- Bank of America Corp. (In re Newsom), Jendusa -v- North American Savings Bank, FSB (In re Jendusa), Ruhl -v- HSBC Fin. Corp. and HSBC Mortgage Services (In re Ruhl) - Chapter 13 debtor-mortgagors sued defendant-mortgagees for violating 11 U.S.C. § 1322(e) by wrongfully receiving interest-on-interest on their claims. The debtor-mortgagors sought disgorgement of the wrongfully paid interest-on-interest pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(j) and 1322(e), and claimed abuse of process under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). The court found that plaintiffs had standing to pursue this action on behalf of the Chapter 13 estate pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 6009. Nonetheless, the court dismissed these actions, finding that the actions were procedurally deficient. The court reasoned that the parties were required to invoke Bankruptcy Rule 3008 and proceed by means of a motion to reconsider and only if then successful seek further relief.  *Note- reversed and remanded.

Blomberg, et al -v- Riley (In re Elizabeth F. Riley) - The court denied the debtor’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(B) by applying the reverse alter ego theory and finding that the debtor’s failure to list certain real estate owned by a corporation in which the debtor was the majority and controlling shareholder and which had significant personal value to her, constituted a concealment of estate property with the intent to defraud the bankruptcy trustee. The court also denied the debtor’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A), and found that the debtor’s listing of her corporate stock interest at a zero value in her schedules constituted a false oath.

Car Care Center of Crystal Lake, LTD. -v- Gary E. Miller  - (In re Gary E. Miller and Bonnie B. Miller) - The court ruled that an adversary proceeding brought under 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1) must be brought within the jurisdictional time limitation set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 727(e).

In re John L. Meyer and Beth A. Meyer - In a dispute over the proper amount of a claim arising from the damage provision of a lease contract, the court followed the fundamental rule of statutory construction that ambiguous contract provisions should be construed against the drafter.

Kelvin W. Krause -v- Vicky Groom (In re Kelvin W. Krause) - Adversary proceeding involving the debtor's remaining obligation to non-filing ex-spouse of $14,500 (payable at the rate of $500 per month over 36 months and labeled as "maintenance payments" in the marital settlement agreement) which was determined by the court to be a maintenance debt which is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 523(a)(5). 

 

 

Last Updated ( Wednesday, 09 September 2009 )
 
Hon. Susan V. Kelley

Dandridge, et al. v. Aurora Health Care, No. 09-2469 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Jan. 6, 2010)
Equitable remand of removed state court litigation was not ordered when case involved core bankruptcy proceeding and interpretation of bankruptcy court's confirmation order.  Plaintiff's request for a jury trial, if appropriate, could be accommodated.

Ortiz, et al. v. Aurora Health Care, No. 09-2199 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Jan. 5, 2010)
Even though adversary proceeding involved alleged violation of state statute, mandatory abstention was not appropriate for core proceeding and when there was no pending state court action, and permissive abstention was denied when bankruptcy court would be called upon to interpret its confirmation order.

Christenson v. Lee (In re Lee), 415 B.R. 367 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2009)
Debtor's discharge was not denied where records kept by Debtor were appropriate for types of business in which he engaged, and ommissions from Schedules appeared inadvertant, but debt based on false representations made in inducing creditor to purchase nontransferable weapons was held not dischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A).

In re Thongta, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1428 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. June 5, 2009)
Co-debtor stay of § 1301 did not serve to stay enforcement of the debt because it was not a debt "of the debtor."  Further, the stay did not protect the non-filing spouse from collection activities stemming from her own personal liability.

In re Nelsen, 404 B.R. 892 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2009)
Debtor's age and downturn in economy did not constitute "exceptional circumstances" to justify discharge of student loan. 

In re Dionne, 402 B.R. 883 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2009)
In calculating disposable income, Chapter 13 debtors could deduct secured payments that were contractually due on the date of the petition, even though they intended to surrender the collateral.

In re Thongta, 401 B.R. 363 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2009)
Creditor's pursuit of Chapter 13 debtor's non-debtor spouse for auto accident claim violated stay when creditor docketed judgment that became a lien on property of the estate.

In re Landry, No. 08-C-947 (E.D. Wis. April 7, 2009)
District Court opinion affirming the decision of the bankruptcy court.  Credit card debt was dischargeable, given that creditor failed to prove fraud or false representation on the part of the debtor.

In re Mravik, 399 B.R. 202 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008)
Language of § 707(b) that a court "may" dismiss indicates discretion, and court declined to dismiss presumed abusive case where no payments would be made to creditors under a Chapter 13 plan.

In re Crawford, 397 B.R. 461 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008)
Negative equity financed as part of new vehicle loan did not qualify for purchase money security interest treatment under the "hanging paragraph" of section 1325(a). The court adopted the "dual purpose" rule, allowing only the portion of the secured claim in the new car to qualify for hanging paragraph treatment.

In re Stascak, No. 08-24392 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Oct. 3, 2008)
Where 401(k) loan will be paid in full before end of Chapter 13 plan, payments on loan must be pro-rated over the life of the plan in order to comply with § 1322(f).

In re Schley, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2214 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Aug. 22, 2008)
"Special circumstances" did not exist where debtor worked as an occupational therapist for a school system, only receiving income during 9 months of the year.

In re Cruz, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2540 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Aug. 11, 2008)
Entire bonus received in 6-month prefiling period was included in current monthly income.

In re Luedtke, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2118 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. July 31, 2008)
Secured creditor's affirmative credit reporting of original debt rather than debt as modified by debtor's confirmed Chapter 13 plan was a violation of § 1327.

In re Price, No. 08-24090 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. June 25, 2008)
Utility deposit for above-poverty guideline Chapter 7 debtor was reduced based on debtor's motion under § 366(b).

In re Cannon, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1870 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. June 23, 2008)
No § 366 utility deposit required when Chapter 7 debtor's income was below poverty guidelines, and deposit could not be required under applicable Public Service Regulations.

Sensient Tech. Corp. v. Baiocchi (In re Baiocchi), 389 B.R. 828 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008). A for-profit corporation's employee tuition reimbursement program constituted an educational benefit under § 523(a)(8).  The Court held that the Debtor's obligation to repay the debt was therefore nondischargeable in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

In re Ford, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1381 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. April 29, 2008)
A vehicle that was not purchased for the personal use of the Debtor did not qualify for 910-treatment under the first portion of the hanging paragraph.  Since the lender had a purchase money security interest in the vehicle and not "any other thing of value" the second portion of the hanging paragraph also did not apply.  The Court questioned the good faith of the debtor in proposing to cram down on a brand new vehicle that the debtor did not use.

In re Spraggins, 386 B.R. 221 (Bankr. E.D. 2008)  Supplemental_Opinion  2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1512 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. May 14, 2008)
Below-median Chapter 13 debtor's projected disposable income is determined by Form B22C not Schedule I, and tax refunds need not be dedicated if debtor deducts actual taxes incurred from income. 

In re Crego, 387 B.R. 225 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008)
Married debtors who filed joint petition but were living separately and in the process of divorce could claim expenses of second household as "special circumstances" but the expenses of that household were limited to the appropriate National and Local Standards. 

In re FV Steel & Wire Co., 372 B.R. 446 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2007).
Analyzing CERCLA's provisions for the cost of recovery and removal of environmental hazards at a contaminated site, there was no clear proof that the EPA viewed the site as an imminent threat, and the Court valued a claim filed by a co-debtor on behalf of the EPA in the amount of $75,000.

In re Wetzel, 381 B.R. 247 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008).
Debtors' post-confirmation inheritance and business income is property of the Chapter 13 estate, and proper subject of Trustee's modification of plan to increase payments.

In re Boehlke, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 235 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Jan. 30, 2008)
Debtors' vehicle lease payments are not payments on secured claim and cannot be deducted as secured claim payments on Line 42 or 23(b) of Form B22A.  Debtor can deduct ownership/lease expenses on Line 23(a).

Swanson v. Green (In re Green), 2007 WL 4570590 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Dec. 21, 2007)
Debtors' discharge was denied based on § 727(a)(2) and (a)(4), when debtors failed to list personal property (Beanie Babies and Disney memorabilia) collected over many years and which debtors believed did not have value to anyone else. Court held that debtors should have listed property in general terms and given its value as unknown.

In re McPike, 2007 WL 2317420 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Aug. 8, 2007).
Trustee's Objection to Plan Modification based on disposable income was overruled.  Debtor's modification was approved as having been filed in good faith. 

In re Stimac, 366 B.R. 889 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2007).
For purposes of Form B22C, above-median debtors may deduct expenses for both their "basic home telephone service" (Line 25A) as well as cell phones and other telecommunications expenses (Line 37), as long as these other expenses are necessary for the health and welfare of the debtor or for the production of income. With respect to the Line 30 deduction for taxes, an above-median debtor may simply deduct the amount withheld from the debtor's paycheck as long as the debtor dedicates 50% of any tax refunds to the plan.  If the debtor chooses not to dedicate 50% of the tax refunds, the correct Line 30 tax deduction will be presumed to be the amount actually paid in taxes as evidenced by the most recent tax return filed.  The debtor may rebut this presumption by showing that the taxes paid in the most recent year would constitute an inaccurate deduction due to a change in circumstances; the trustee will then have the opportunity to challenge the accuracy or reasonableness of the debtor's calculations.

In re Cline, No. 06-25495-svk (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Mar. 26, 2007).
In Chapter 7 Cases, the U.S. Trustee must file his statement of presumed abuse under § 704(b) within 10 days of the first date set for the meeting of creditors rather than the conclusion of the meeting of creditors.  Although Bankruptcy Rule 9006 does not permit extension of this deadline, the Court may use its power under § 105(a) to extend the deadline if it appears that the debtor is attempting to abuse the bankruptcy process.

In re Nockerts, 357 B.R. 497 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006).
"Scheduled as contractually due" for purposes of § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) means due under the contract between the debtor and secured creditor. The determination is to be made as of the date of the Chapter 7 petition, for purposes of the "presumption of abuse" in § 707(b)(2)(A)(i), and debtor's intent not to reaffirm is not relevant, as long as debtor is contractually obligated to make the payments on the date of the petition. For purposes of § 707(b)(3), more than the ability to pay some of the debt in a chapter 13 plan is needed to show an abuse under the "totality of the circumstances" test.

In re McCormick, 2006 WL 3499226 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Dec. 5, 2006).
Till applies to 910 claims, and interest needs to be paid on such claims. In this case, given the very low risk of default, no additional interest was required to be added to the prime rate.

In re Grunert, 353 B.R. 591 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006).
Above-median debtors could take Local Standard expense deduction for vehicle ownership/lease expense, even though they owned their vehicle free and clear of liens.

In re Turkowitch, 355 B.R. 120 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006).
Surrender of collateral in complete satisfaction of 910-car creditor's claim is permitted by hanging paragraph of § 1325(a).

In re FV Steel & Wire, 349 B.R. 181 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006).
Judicial estoppel does not apply to block claim of debtor who had inadvertently neglected to schedule claim and who cured the omission as soon as she learned of it.  Also, Trustee had succeeded to claim and was not judicially estopped by debtor's omission.

In re Guzman, 345 B.R. 640 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006).
Under BAPCPA § 1325(b)(3), reasonably necessary expenses to be deducted to determine disposable income of above-median debtors are based on Form B22C, not Schedule J.

In re Kirchen, 344 B.R. 908 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006).
Inherited IRA is not exempt as a retirement benefit under Wis. Stat. § 815.18(3)(j).

Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Addison (In re Addison), 05-2583 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. July 11, 2006) (unpublished).
Debtor borrowed vehicle without permission and damaged the vehicle.  Resulting debt to insurance company was dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

In re Estrada, No. 03-33013-svk (Bankr. E.D. Wis. June 14, 2006) (unpublished)
In a pre-BAPCPA case, after secured vehicle was totally destroyed in an accident, secured creditor's recovery of insurance proceeds was limited to the amount of the allowed secured claim (net of payments received under the plan) as determined by Debtor's confirmed chapter 13 plan.  Plan provided that property did not revest in debtor at confirmation; accordingly excess proceeds had to be paid to the Trustee.

In re Racette, 343 B.R. 200 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006).
Debtors' request to strike petition that was filed without Section 109(h) credit briefing certificate was denied.  Instead, case was dismissed, and counted as a case for purposes of Section 362(c)(3).

In re Xiong, No 05-43121-svk (Bankr. E.D. Wis. May 3, 2006).
Property that debtor owned with non-filing spouse when they moved to Wisconsin was not marital property, and non-filing spouse's interest was not property of the estate.  As to property that did constitute marital property, debtor was entitled to exempt the full amount of the equity (up to the value of the federal exemptions) not just one-half.

In re Przybylski,  340 B.R. 624 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006).
Debtors' pre-bankruptcy planning included potentially avoidable transfers, and at least some of the exemptions were created with extrinsic signs of fraud. The Debtors' plan could not be confirmed due to failure of the best interest of creditors test, and, under the totality of the circumstances, the plan was not proposed in good faith.

In re Gilbertson, 340 B.R. 618 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006), vacated by 2007 WL 433096.
Compensation for professionals retained under § 328 cannot be reviewed for reasonableness.

In re Habiballa, 337 B.R. 911 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006).
Claim Objections must be supported by evidence, even when claims lack supporting documentation and detail.

In re Murray, 330 B.R. 732 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2005).
Flat fee of $2,000 for chapter 7 debtor's attorney in routine case was reduced on objection of US Trustee. The fee was set to cover discharge and exemption litigation that never materialized.

In re FV Steel & Wire, 331 B.R. 385 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2005), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, remanded by 350 B.R. 835 (E.D. Wis. 2006).
Treatment of CERCLA contribution claims.

In re Czerneski, 330 B.R. 240 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2005).
A debtor husband could not claim the hardship exemption available to divorcing parties under Wis. Stat. § 767.255 and his payment of real estate taxes with marital funds was insufficient under Wis. Stat. § 766.63(1) to establish a marital interest in his wife's land and a federal wildcard exemption under Bankruptcy Code § 521(d)(5).

In re Tirado, 329 B.R. 244 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2005).
Chapter 13 debtor's real estate broker was not required to comply with sections 327 and 330, and could be given an administrative claim under section 503(b).

In re Asherman, No. 04-33391-svk (Bankr. E.D. Wis. May 9, 2005) (unpublished).
Debtor's employer held in contempt for failure to comply with payroll order.

In re Nejedlo,  324 B.R. 697 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2005).
Evidence is needed to support Objections to Claims, even in the absence of response or appearance by Claimant. Agent is liable for corporate debt, where corporation's existence is not disclosed to Claimant.

In re Grabow, 323 B.R. 236 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2005).
Chapter 13 plan that treated real estate tax claim as priority claim, not secured claim, could not be confirmed.

In re Jarosz, 322 B.R. 662 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2005).
In default context, invalid mortgage is an avoidable preferential transfer.

In re Olsen, 322 B.R. 400 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2005).
In a lien avoidance action under Bankruptcy Code § 522(f), real property which was once contiguous to the homestead dwelling but then severed from it, is not "reasonably necessary" for the Debtors’ use as a home under Wis. Stats. § 990.01(14).

In re Bowles, 318 B.R. 129 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004).
Wisconsin's "theft by contractor" statute does not apply to a project in Illinois, for purposes of a nondischargeability action under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(4).

In re Spraggins, 316 B.R. 317 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004).
The replacement value for consumer goods purchased within 90 days of filing the bankruptcy petition is the purchase price of the goods. For automobiles, the purchase price is the presumptive replacement value, unless other evidence is presented.

In re Bungert,  315 B.R. 735 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004).
Proof required for entry of a default judgment in a nondischargeability action under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(2)(A) for credit card debt.

In re Gladney, No. 03-31411-svk (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Aug. 3, 2004) (unpublished).
Trustee not allowed to unabandon property.

In re Pokrzywinski,  311 B.R. 846 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004).
Simple interest, not add-on interest, is the proper method for calculating the amount of interest required on a Chapter 13 plan.

In re Bouzek,  311 B.R. 239 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004).
Wholesale (liquidation) value is the proper valuation for the redemption of collateral under Bankruptcy Code § 722.

In re Howard, 311 B.R. 230 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004).
The injunction provision of Bankruptcy Code § 109(g)(2) is permissive, rather than mandatory.  See also
Grossman v. Beal (In re Beal), 347 B.R. 87 (E.D. Wis. 2006).

In re Childers, 311 B.R. 232 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004).
Inability to pay does not establish the fraudulent intent necessary for the entry of a default judgment in a nondischargeability action for NSF checks.

In re Guseck, 310 B.R. 400 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004).
No need to reopen closed no-asset case to add unscheduled creditors to discharge "garden variety" debts.

In re FV Steel & Wire Co., 310 B.R. 390 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004).
Under old UCC Article 9, a financing statement listing only the debtor's trade name is "seriously misleading."

In re Harris, 310 B.R. 395 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004).
Violation of the automatic stay found when debtor’s former spouse attempted to reduce the maintenance he owed to her to compensate for her failure to pay a property division debt.

In re Wescott, 309 B.R. 308 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004).
Debtor can cure a mortgage arrearage in a Chapter 13 plan after the sheriff's sale and up until the confirmation hearing, because, under Wisconsin law, the debtor has the right to redeem the property up until the sheriff's sale is confirmed by the state court.

In re Nelson, 308 B.R. 343 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2004).
Discharge injunction of Bankruptcy Code § 524(a)(3) does not apply where spouses file joint, rather than serial, cases.

In re Mikulsky, 301 B.R. 726 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2003).
Collateral estoppel applies to a nondischargeability proceeding where the state court awarded punitive damages based on the debtor's malicious conduct.

In re Young, 310 B.R. 127 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2003).
When a mortgage arrearage is cured under Bankruptcy Code § 1322(e), a mortgage creditor is entitled to no more than it would have received under its written agreement with the mortgagor.

In re Merriwether, No. 02-02424-svk (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Nov. 5, 2003) (unpublished).
Undue hardship is a difficult burden for a debtor to overcome, and to discharge student loan debts requires much more than a garden variety hardship.

In re Trevisan, 300 B.R. 708 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2003).
A prima facie case for fraud is required for an entry of a default judgment in a Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(2)(A) nondischargeability action for passing NSF checks.

In re Delta Group,  300 B.R. 918 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2003).
Bankruptcy Code § 544(b) does not allow a trustee in bankruptcy to avail himself of avoidance powers found under Wis. Stats. § 128.07.

In re Brandenburg, No. 07-20244-svk
Debtor's mortgage payments on a Minnesota condominium that had been sold at a foreclosure sale two days before the petition could not be deducted on Line 42 of Form B22A as "scheduled as contractually due," due to the provisions of Minnesota foreclosure law. The same result may not occur under Wisconsin Law. 

 

Last Updated ( Thursday, 07 January 2010 )
 
Hon. Pamela Pepper

In re Terra Dev. Co. v. McCoy, 09-2433. (Bankr. E.D.Wis. January, 2010)
Where a debtor converts the underlying bankruptcy case from one under Chapter 7 to one under Chapter 13 before the deadline for filing an answer to a 727 complaint objecting to discharge,the conversion does not moot the 727 cause of action.  Rather, it renders that cause of action dormant.  The appropriate disposition of the 727 adversary proceeding is for the court to stay the proceedings and close the adversary case, subject to a motion to reopen in the event that the underlying bankruptcy case reconverts to one under Chapter 7.

In re: Ganther Construction, Inc. v. Ward, 08-2242 (Bankr. E.D.Wis. October, 2009)
In a nondischargeability action under §523(a)(4), the plaintiff failed to prove the element of defalcation in a fiduciary capacity, because it failed to prove that the defendant's violation of Wisconsin's theft-by-contractor (Wis. Stat. §779.02(5)) law involved more than mere negligence.

In re Hanley, 09-21220 (Bankr. E.D.Wis. August, 2009)
While the fact that a debt is "disputed" does not make it "unliquidated" for the purposes of determining whether a debtor has exceeded the Chapter 13 debt limit, a dispute over whether the debt ever existed or will exist can render the nature of the debt "unliquidated."  Even applying that test, however, the Court found that the particular debt in question was "liquidated," and needed to be included in the calculation of the debt limits.

In Re: Scaffidi v. Barbosa, 08-2056 (Bankr. E.D.Wis. June, 2009)
The Court granted the plaintiff trustee's motion for default judgment against the debtor's former husband. The Court agreed with the trustee that the debtor's 2007 transfer of her interest in the former marital homestead via a quitclaim deed was avoidable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 549(a) as an unauthorized, post-petition transfer of estate property. The Court further found that the debtor's 2005 transfer of her interest in certain assets to the defendant via a Marital Settlement Agreement ("MSA") constituted a transfer in constructive fraud of her creditors pursuant to Wis. Stat. 242.04(1)(b), and therefore was avoidable under 11 U.S.C. 544(b)(1). The Court concluded that when the debtor signed the MSA and transferred to the defendant her interest in half of the marital homestead, as well as her interest in anything in the defendant's possession, she reasonably should have believed that this transfer would cause her to incur debts beyond her ability to pay as they became due. After the transfer, the debtor--unemployed and disabled--was left with no real estate, no assets other than a 14-year-old car, and only her disability income and a small maintenance payment from the defendant.

In Re: Streckrich Petro Corporation, 08-31860 (Bankr. E.D.Wis. June, 2009)
The Court granted the Chapter 11 creditor's motion to compel the debtor-in-possession to assume or reject a lease. The Court first agreed with the creditor that the agreement in question was, in fact, a lease under Missouri law, overruling the debtor-in-possession's objection that the agreement was something other than a lease. The Court then held that by filing the motion to compel before the expiration of the 120-day assumption period, the creditor had, in effect, tolled that period. The Court concluded that seven (7) days remained during which the debtor-in-possession could elect to assume or reject the lease, or could request that the Court extend the time for it to make that decision.

In Re Gwaltney, 07-29919 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. March, 2009)
Debtor who obtained homestead property in violation of a due-on-sale clause does not impermissibly modify creditor's rights in violation of 11 U.S.C. section 1322(b)(2) in proposing to pay the arrearages on the mortgage debt through a Chapter 13 plan.

In Re Reynolds, 07-30434 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. January, 2009)
The Court concluded that the totality of the debtors' circumstances demonstrated an abuse of the provisions of Chapter 7, and therefore granted the United States Trustee's motion to dismiss if the debtors did not convert within 30 days.  The Court based its decision on the fact that the debtors appeared to have funds and assets available that gave them some ability to pay their creditors.  The Court noted, however, that the fact that the debtors were contributing to a 401k plan and were repaying a 401k loan did not, by themselves, justify dismissal of the case, as those payments would be deductible in a Chapter 13 context.  The Court also concluded that the United States Trustee had failed to present any evidence regarding how long the debtors would have to make the 401k loan repayments, and whether, at some point during the life of a Chapter 13 plan, those funds would become available to pay unsecured creditors.

 

In Re Lackowski, 08-21496 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. September, 2008)
Pursuant to the Wisconsin exemption statutes, debtor who lives part-time in rented apartment in Milwaukee and part-time in a mobile home she owns in Adams County can claim the homestead exemption for the Adams County property. She can do so in spite of the fact that all of the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing on the matter indicated that the debtor considered the Milwaukee County apartment her legal residence. The Court found that the debtor "occupied" the Adams County residence for the purpose of the exemption, albeit on a part-time basis.

In Re Johns, 08-24311 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. July, 2008)
When the Court denies a serial debtor's motion to continue the stay pursuant to section 362(c)(3), the stay terminates as to the property of the estate, and not just as to the property of the debtor.

In Re Smith, 07-30540 (Bankr.S.D. Ill. June, 2008)
The debtor purchased a vehicle within 910 days of filing her Chapter 13 petition. The financing for this purchase included funds loaned to pay taxes, administrative fees, service fees, gap insurance, a service contract and the negative equity on the debtor's trade-in vehicle. The Court held that the fact that the debtor's obligation to the creditor included these components did not deprive the creditor of its purchase money security interest in the collateral, and therefore that, pursuant to the hanging paragraph of 11 U.S.C. section 1325(a), the debtor could not cram down the creditor's interest.

In Re Van Bodegom Smith, 07-25202 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. March, 2008)
Above-median-income Chapter 13 debtors cannot subtract from their current monthly income secured debt payments for collateral they intend to surrender when calculating their projected disposal income.

In Re Action Transit, 07-27904 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. January, 2008)
Contract between debtor-in-possession and creditor was not a true lease, but was a security interest as defined in Wis. Stat. section 401.201(37), and therefore the debtor was not required to pay the creditor according to the terms of the contract.  Rather, it could make adequate protection payments sufficient to protect the creditor's interest in the collateral.

In Re Scofield, 07-22127 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. November, 2007)
Debtors who convert from a case under Chapter 13 to a case under Chapter 7 are required to file a Form B22A upon conversion.

In Re Stoltz, 07-22864 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. October, 2007)
Chapter 13 plan which relied on the language of the Eastern District model plan could not be confirmed in the face of objections that it did not clearly direct the trustee to distribute the amount listed in the creditor's proof of claim rather than the amount listed in the plan, and that it did not clearly indicate when the debtors intended the property of the estate to revest in the debtors.

In Re Fritz v. USA Funding Corp. and GMAC Mortgage Corp., 06-2085 (BR case 05-45778)
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. October, 2007)
The Court dismissed the plaintiffs'/debtors' Truth-in-Lending Act claims against defendant GMAC Mortgage Corp. in their entirety, and dismissed the plaintiffs'/debtors' TILA claims against defendant USA Funding Corp. in part, because (1) some claims were barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, (2) others were barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, and (3) still others failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  The only claims to survive the motions to dismiss were the plaintiffs'/debtors' claims for declaratory judgment and damages against USA Funding Corp. for alleged violations to TILA

In Re Davis 07-24688  (Bankr. E.D. Wis. September, 2007)
In a case in which the debtors' plan proposed to pay 100% to the unsecured creditors, the court overruled the Chapter 13 trustee's objection to the debtors' proposal to pay the consenting secured auto lender's claim outside the plan.

In Re Kirsch 07-20338 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. August, 2007)
Contested Chapter 13 plan which was silent as to treatment of tax refunds in a case where below-median-income debtor listed the refund as income on Schedule I and utilized it for expenses on Schedule J could not be confirmed, because it violated the disposable income requirement of 11 U.S.C. 1325(b).

In Re Kiedrowski 06-24318 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. August, 2007)
The district court's decision in In re Ross-Tousey effectively overrules this Court's decision in In re Sawdy, and therefore Chapter 13 debtors may deduct the vehicle ownership expense on their Form B22C only if they have a note or loan payment, and not if they own a vehicle outright.

In Re Smith 06-20127 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. May, 2007)
When a creditor files its proof of claim pre-petition and the debtor (a) proposes a plan that specifically articulates how it will treat that creditor's claim, (2) that treatment is different than the treatment in the proof of claim, and (3) the debtor serves the plan on that creditor, the treatment in the confirmed plan controls over the proof of claim if the creditor does not object to its treatment pre-confirmation.

In Re Walls 06-21228 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. April, 2007)
The appropriate way for a below-median-income debtor to secure for her own needs the entirety of any tax refund she may receive over the life of the Chapter 13 plan is not by writing such a provision in the plan.  Rather, it is by asking the trustee, and if necessary the Court, to allow her to keep the refund for any particular year based on her need to retain for her support and maintenance.

In Re Sawdy 06-25130 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.  February, 2007)
Chapter 13 debtors are entitled to deduct the IRS Local Standard expense for vehicle ownership from their Form B22C even if they own their vehicles outright and do not actually make note or lease payments each month.

In Re Kowalewski 06-20774 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. November, 2006)
In In re Balcerowski, the Court held that a debtor must subtract his actual tax expense from his Schedule I income to determine projected disposable income for Chapter 13 purposes.  In this matter, the Court declines to dictate to the parties the method they should use to determine the actual tax expense.  Debtors must make a good-faith effort, under the circumstances of their particular cases, to determine what their actual tax expenses will be.

In re: Balcerowski, 06-21695   (Bankr. E.D. Wis. October, 2006)
The appropriate expense for the purpose of determining disposable income under section 1325(b)(1)(B) of BAPCPA is for the debtor to estimate, and subtract from his income, the actual tax he will incur, not the amount he has withheld from his wages.  The debtor should calculate this actual tax based on his income at the time he filed his petition, and not solely upon his historical, "current monthly income" income figure.

In re: Charmaine A. Richie, 06-20188 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. October, 2006)
A debtor who, at the time of the hearing on the trustee's motion to dismiss, lacks the ability to pay her creditors because she has not engaged in a broad employment search, does not wish to work outside her chosen field, does not wish to work within her chosen field outside of southeastern Wisconsin, and takes this position at the expense of her creditors, "abuses" the provisions of Chapter 7 as that term is used in the new version of section 707(b) promulgated by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.

In re: Robert Edward Baldewicz III, 06-21117 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. September 14, 2006)
Under the facts and circumstances of these particular cases, one month after the date the debtors filed their petitions was too soon to conclude that the $2,500 presumptively reasonable fee charged by debtors' counsel was unreasonable.  This is partly because one of the factors this Court considers in determining the reasonableness of the presumptively reasonable fee is the range of services counsel provides in exchange for the presumptively reasonable fee, and a month into the matter is too soon to determine whether counsel is providing a comprehensive range of services in exchange for the fee.

In re: Doris Marie Maxwell, 06-21226 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. September 14, 2006)
Under the facts and circumstances of these particular cases, one month after the date the debtors filed their petitions was too soon to conclude that the $2,500 presumptively reasonable fee charged by debtors' counsel was unreasonable.  This is partly because one of the factors this Court considers in determining the reasonableness of the presumptively reasonable fee is the range of services counsel provides in exchange for the presumptively reasonable fee, and a month into the matter is too soon to determine whether counsel is providing a comprehensive range of services in exchange for the fee.

In re: John E. and Antonieta V. Fuller, 06-30313 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. June 16, 2006)
In order to determine whether a Chapter 13 debtor is committing all of her "projected disposable income" to a plan under section 1325(b)(1)(B) of BAPCPA, parties must not limit their consideration to Form B22C ("Statement of Current Monthly Income and Calculation of Commitment Period and Disposable Income"), but must also consider the income at the time of filing as reflected on Schedule I.

In re: Spears, 06-21015  (Bankr. E.D. Wis. June 19, 2006)
Section 109(h) of BAPCPA does not require a debtor to wait a day between the day she obtains her credit briefing and the day she files her petition for relief.  A debtor who obtains the credit briefing at any time during the 180 days prior to the moment she files her petition has complied with section 109(h).

In re: Pham, 06-20779 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. May 31, 2006)
Discussion of the circumstances under which courts will require reaffirmation hearings under BAPCPA.

In re: Kinnee, 06-21356 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. May, 2006)
Debtors whose debt is primarily business debt, rather than consumer debt, are not required to file Form B22A (the means test calculations). For a debtor to have debt that is "primarily" business debt, the business debt must comprise more than 50% of the overall debt.

In re: Adams, 06-20190 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. April 12, 2006)
It was inappropriate for a bank to require a debtor to execute a reaffirmation agreement as a condition of re-activating her credit card, when debtor did not owe a debt to the bank and the bank did not hold a claim in the bankruptcy.

In re: Berntsen, 06-20644 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. April 10, 2006)
Section 362(d)(4) of BAPCPA provides that in cases where the court finds that the debtor filed the petition as part of a scheme to hinder, delay or defraud creditors by multiple bankruptcy filings involving real property, if the order lifting the stay on the real property is recorded in compliance with state laws governing notices of interest or liens on real property, the order lifting the stay runs with the property and remains in effect as to anyone who files bankruptcy regarding that property for a period of two years after the date of the order, unless the subsequent filer can demonstrate a change in circumstances or good cause.

In re: French, 06-20066 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. March 21, 2006)
The trustee withheld recommending confirmation until such time as the debtor could file her 2005 tax returns, relaying on section 1308 of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. That section requires debtors to file the tax returns for the four years preceding the filing of the petition before confirmation can be recommended. The debtor argued that, because her 2005 return was not yet due under applicable tax law, she was not required to file it, and therefore the trustee was unreasonably delaying its discharge recommendation. The Court held that the trustee correctly delayed recommending confirmation until the 2005 return could be filed--the statue envisions and allows for just such a delay in cases where a debtor files for bankruptcy in the first 3 1/2 months of the year, before the previous year's returns are due.

In re: Perkins, 05-45816 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. March 2006)
Section 1325(a) of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 does not abrogate the Supreme Court's holding in Till v. SCS Credit Corporation as it relates to vehicles purchased for the debtor's personal use within 910 days of the bankruptcy filing. The 'hanging paragraph' of section 1325(a) does away with the practice of bifurcating claims into secured and unsecured portions; it does not alter the Till rate on post-petition interest.

In re: Farchmin, 05-45947 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. February 2, 2006)
In most cases, it is not necessary or appropriate to move the court to extend the time for filing tax returns under section 521 of BAPCPA. Section 521(e) requires certain tax returns to be provided to the trustee, and therefore the trustee is the person to whom requests to extend time should be addressed. Section 521(f) requires tax returns to be filed with the court only if the court, the U.S. Trustee, or a party in interests requests that they be filed. If such a request has been made by the U.S. Trustee or a party, debtors seeking an extension should confer with the party requesting the filing, and should indicate in the motion whether that party agrees to the extension of time.

Berntsen, No. 05-45950 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. January 30, 2006)
Section 362(j) of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 mandates that, upon the request of a party, the court shall issue a comfort order indicating that the 30-day stay has terminated in cases governed by section 362(c)(3) of the Act.

In re Gray, No. 05-45793 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. January 30, 2006)
A debtor for whom the automatic stay terminates after 30 days under section 362(c)(3)(A) of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 because she had a previous filing dismissed within the year preceding the current petition may seek to have the stay re-imposed under section 362(c)(4)(B), if her request is filed within 30 days of the date of the current petition, she provides adequate notice to the appropriate creditors, and she rebuts the presumption that the current filing was made in bad faith.

In re Harvey No. 05-44655, Ramirez 05-44654, Martin 05-44653, Stelmack 05-44652, Green 05-44651, Johnson 05-44650  (Bankr. E.D. Wis. December 8, 2005)
Debtors' cases were filed electronically. They were not received by the clerk's office until the early minutes of October 17, 2005--the date the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 was implemented. Debtors argued that the matters would have been filed on October 16--under the Bankruptcy Code--but for a problem with the Court's CM/ECF system. The Court held that documents submitted electronically are not "filed" until they are received by the clerk's office and the clerk's office issues a Notice of Filing. The Court further found that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate a problem with the CM/ECF system. Accordingly, the Court denied the debtors' request to find that their cases were filed under the Bankruptcy Code.

In re Reed, No. 05-45739 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. November 14, 2005)
Debtors who request a "waiver" of the BAPCPA requirement of pre-filing credit briefing must both describe exigent circumstances and indicate that they tried to get the briefing but couldn't do so within five days of their request. Even when they meet both of these requirements, debtors do not receive a "waiver" of the credit briefing requirement, but must obtain a credit briefing within 30 days of the date of filing, with a possible 15-day extension for cause.

 

Last Updated ( Tuesday, 26 January 2010 )
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